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SUMMARY 
The eastern neighbourhood policy of the 
European Union has become more accen-
tuated in consequence of the recent 
enlargement process. Central European 
new member states are the eastern terri-
tories of the Union, and their borders to 
the East represent the frontiers of the EU 
in this part of Europe. This new situa-
tion substantially affects existing political 
and economic links with Russia and will 
modify the framework of this relation-
ship. The changing conditions significantly 
increased the importance of EU—Russia 
summits. 
While the enlargement is expected to 
tighten further the already strong links 
between the previous EU members and 
the new member states, the latter group 
of countries may not and should not ne-
glect their economic and political ties 
with Russia. In the medium term Central 
European countries should take into con-
sideration the effects of the growth po-
tential of the Russian economy at both 
macroeconomic and microeconomic levels 
as well as Moscow’s non-negligible politi-
cal role in the currently changing world. 
These conference proceedings concern 
three main areas of the changing rela-
tions between Russia and the Central 
European new EU member states. Firstly, 
the political and strategic relations; sec-
ondly, the effects of shadow economy 
and corruption on the microeconomic 
level of links between Russia and the 
Central European countries; and thirdly, 
the economic and commercial relations. 
The following papers include comparative 
analyses and pay particular attention to 
the specific features of the ties between 
group of countries or the bilateral rela-
tions between two selected countries. 
These comparative analyses and the case 
studies show such pictures that can re-
flect the complexity of relations. 
The first part of this collection deals 
with the political and strategic issues. 
The paper of A. DULEBA looks at the re-
lations between the new EU member 
states and Russia in the context of 
global political interests and actions of 
the EU, the US and Russia. He formu-
lates his own theses and questions, which 
represent the main foreign policy and 
security framework and conditions for 
the links between the new EU member 
states and Russia. The paper of A. 
ORBAN focuses on the particular features 
of the eastern policy of the EU. She 
points out some major dilemmas on both 
sides. These are analysed from the Rus-
sian perspective by E. KLITSOUNOVA. Her 
paper exposes the different attitudes and 
discourses of Russia concerning the EU 
and NATO as well as the future strate-
gic orientation of Russian policy towards 
the Union. This will most likely be a 
rather interest-driven than a value-driven 
process, which includes supporting and 
hindering elements. Under such condi-
tions a more precise determination of EU 
neighbourhood policy seems necessary 
and unavoidable. The analysis of bilateral 
relations between the Czech Republic and 
Russia by P. KRATOCHVIL shows the par-
ticular aspects of the complexity of this 
neighbourhood. His study presents the 
various historical stages of development 
in these relations from a cool atmos-
phere to their normalisation. 
The second part of the collection con-
tains the papers about the effects of 
shadow economy and corruption on the 
microeconomic level of the relations be-
tween Russia and the Central European 
countries. The essay of S. P. GLINKINA 
deals with the topical issue of “decrimi-
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nalisation” of Russian economy, which 
entails the development of the tax collec-
tion system, the effective protection of 
property rights, the respect of contracts 
and guaranteeing the rule of law, as 
well as the strengthening of control bod-
ies, etc. The ties between the business 
sector and the state in Russia are a par-
ticular segment of corruption. Its various 
aspects are analysed by O. PACHENKOV. 
In his paper SMEs receive particular 
attention and their problems are shown. 
The roots of corruption can be explained 
by the imperfection of the bureaucratic 
system, and the inadequate laws and 
regulations. The findings of the analysis 
are based on empirical research and an-
swers to a questioner. This situation in 
Russia can be compared to that in Hun-
gary on the basis of the information 
provided by the work of T. BENEDEK et 
al. The paper surveyes the nature of 
corruption and reviewes the development 
path of public procurement procedure in 
Hungary. It points out the weaknesses of 
the existing system and suggests particu-
lar policy tools to reduce corruption in 
public procurement in Hungary. 
The third part focuses on the eco-
nomic and commercial links between the 
new EU member states and Russia, Bela-
rus and Ukraine as well as the direct 
and indirect impacts of EU enlargement 
on the neighbouring countries of the Un-
ion. A general analysis and perspective 
on economic co-operation is given by A. 
KÖVES. He argues that enlargement will 
not bring about further significant 
changes in the commercial and economic 
co-operation between these two groups 
of countries because the change in inte-
gration and commercial reorientation al-
ready took place in the course of the 
1990s. He points out the main features 
and characteristics of these relations and 
prospective development. His views are 
partly challenged by O. S. VASSILEVSKY, 
who expects several adverse effects on 
the commercial relations between the 
Visegrád countries and Belarus after the 
accession of the former. These effects 
will be caused by the changing trade 
regime, tariffs and non-tariff regulations. 
At the same time, he suggests policy 
measures, which can reduce the adverse 
effects. R. GRINBERG draws up a general 
picture of the current and the future 
states of Russian economy. Its actual 
situation and potential development basi-
cally determine the economic relations 
between the EU and Russia and influence 
their political relations. The conclusion of 
this essay is manifold. It points out some 
of the obstacles and shortcomings, how-
ever, it indicates possible solutions as 
well. 
The main message of this collection 
can be summarised rather briefly. In a 
future political process aiming at inte-
grating Russia into the common political 
and economic development of the Euro-
pean continent, the role of Central Euro-
pean EU member countries will be sig-
nificantly upgraded both for the EU and 
Russia. The foundation of this develop-
ment can be and should be laid down 
already now by the three partners in-
volved, the EU, the Central European 
countries and Russia. 
Therefore, we strongly recommend this 
volume to everyone who is interested in 
such political and economic issues that 
will basically influence the future political 
and economic development of the Central 
European new EU member states and 
their neighbours (Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine, etc.). Moreover, these issues will 
certainly determine the political dialogue 
and the economic co-operation between 
two important groups of actors in the 
global political and economic scene, 
namely the EU countries and their new 
eastern neighbours. 
 
The Editors 
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FOREWORD 
ICEG European Centre and our Founda-
tion together with the support of Free-
dom House, UNDP and ITD Hungary 
organised a conference in Budapest in 
February 2004. The topic of the confer-
ence was the impact of the accession of 
the Visegrád countries to the EU on the 
economic relations between these states 
and Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova. That is why business and fi-
nancial companies, certain international 
organisations and state institutions were 
involved in this discussion. The aim of 
the conference was to evaluate the 
emerging new situation on the one hand, 
and to prove that in spite of the EU ac-
cession of the Visegrád countries their 
economic relations with Russia and the 
other neighbouring countries may 
strengthen and should not necessarily 
weaken.  
The political and economic relations 
between the Visegrád countries and Rus-
sia and the other neighbouring countries 
have changed a lot for the last fifteen 
years. The earlier economic, mainly 
commercial relations declined. Many rela-
tions, which seemed to be traditional 
during decades, came to an end or 
weakened. The Visegrád countries as 
well as their eastern neighbours opened 
up to the West. This policy has 
fundamentally changed the direction and 
the volume of their relations among 
themselves. In this process political 
factors also played a significant role. It 
is worth mentioning that new elements, 
too, have appeared in their relations. For 
example, these countries started to invest 
in each other’s economies.  
During the discussion our aim was 
not to evaluate the changes of the past 
decade but rather to analyse the new 
possibilities and opportunities of future 
economic co-operation. It is important 
that the EU accession of the Visegrád 
countries should not cause new difficul-
ties in the economic relations but should 
open up new possible areas of co-
operation among these two groups of 
countries. 
Hungary and the other Visegrád 
countries were preparing for EU mem-
bership for about a decade since meeting 
community requirements needed several 
qualitative and quantitative changes. We 
think that partly similar processes will 
and should also take place in the case 
of Russia and other neighbouring coun-
tries. These changes will be necessary 
particularly in those areas where the 
further development of co-operation with 
the EU makes them unavoidable. If these 
countries start a harmonisation process it 
will probably take a longer time than it 
did in the Visegrád countries. The suc-
cessful completion of harmonisation can 
contribute to further development of re-
lations between small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, joint ventures, the application 
of modern technology and flexible or-
ganisations. 
Regarding the future, one should 
think of the institutionalisation of the re-
lations between the EU and its eastern 
neighbouring countries. One of the alter-
native possibilities is the membership of 
Russia and other neighbouring countries 
in the European Economic Area. This 
status could formalise and institutionalise 
the co-operation. It involves, among oth-
ers, the free movement of goods and the 
fight against organised crime and drugs 
without the implementation of EU rules, 
for example those of common trade pol-
icy, customs union or common agricul-
tural policy. If this policy alternative of 
the EU—Russian relations is discussed in 
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the future, Hungary will surely support 
such solution. 
Finally, I would like to express my 
hope that this conference, the printed 
version of its proceedings and further 
joint research work will contribute to the 
success of academic discussions on these 
issues and to the actual development of 
the political and economic relations be-
tween the EU and its eastern neighbours 
as well as between the Visegrád coun-
tries and their eastern neighbours. 
 
János Szita 
Chairman of the Board of Trustees 
Foundation for Research into 
the World Economy
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PART ONE  
POLITICAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY ISSUES 
 
COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE 
ENLARGED EU: WHAT ROLE FOR NATO AND RUSSIA? 
Alexander Duleba* 
Let me start with a trivial point in order 
to stress not trivial challenges that the 
EU faces in the CFSP area on the eve of 
its upcoming enlargement.  
The CFSP is an imperative result of 
the European integration process. The 
deeper is inner integration within the EU, 
the more common foreign and security 
policy of the EU is required and vice 
versa, the more common is foreign and 
security policy of the EU members, the 
better are prospects for EU integration. 
Should the EU fail in the CFSP area it 
might undermine prospects for the EU as 
such. Bringing national foreign and secu-
rity policies under a common denomina-
tor is much more complicated task for 
Europe of 25 than it was/or/is for 
Europe of 15. The Iraqi crisis shows it 
clearly. The lack of common approach 
among the EU members towards cardinal 
issues of today’s world agenda is a chal-
lenging reality. 
Both the United States and Russia are 
key international actors for the EU rela-
tions with which predetermine a tenet of 
its foreign and security policy. Without 
achieving a common understanding on 
what should be like the EU policy to-
ward the United States and Russia the 
very concept of the EU’ CFSP as such is 
simply impossible.  
Let me use my time to share with you 
my six thesis/or/question marks of which 
three concern the current transatlantic 
agenda and three the EU relations with 
Russia. Let me be frank and a little bit 
provocative in my valuations. All we 
need frank and open discussion in order 
to overcome current disputes and ensure 
prospects for our common future. Strong 
and united EU is I do hope sufficient 
background, which gives enough legiti-
macy for such critical approach. 
1) CFSP AND TRANSATLANTIC 
RELATIONS 
First thesis  
Observing developments in transatlantic 
relations over the last five or six years, 
and especially in the context of Iraqi cri-
sis, I would conclude that no side of the 
Atlantic (United States on one hand and 
some European allies on the other) actu-
ally knows what it expects/wants from 
its partner. This is a challenging reality 
and the key problem of current disputes, 
which lies behind the current transatlan-
tic rift. It is possible to achieve an un-
derstanding and agreement between the 
two sides provided that each of them 
knows clearly what it wants. This is sim-
* Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy 
Association 
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simply impossible when at least one of 
the sides cannot identify clearly what it 
wants. Let me illustrate this thesis 
through main paradoxes of both Euro-
pean and American approaches. 
The main paradox of “European ap-
proach”: Europeans want to see the EU 
become a superpower like the U.S., how-
ever, they resists increased military 
spending. It is still not clear how Euro-
peans want to become the superpower. 
The Amsterdam Treaty came into force 
in 1999. The first Common Strategies of 
the EU has been adopted on Russia, 
Ukraine and Mediterranean Region. 
Should the EU whenever in the future 
develop its coherent and consistent 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
ESDP it has to adapt its Common Strat-
egy on the U.S. Moreover, my conviction 
is that the first Common Strategy of the 
EU at all should be that one on the U.S. 
Without identifying the EU common pol-
icy toward the U.S. the EU CFSP as such 
is not realistic concept. In other words, 
Europeans do not know what they want. 
Rather they have just feeling what they 
do not want in terms of how the U.S. 
should/or/should not behave on interna-
tional scene, but they are still far from 
a clear definition of the European inter-
ests in relations with the U.S., which by 
the same mail must answer question 
what it means the EU as a superpower. 
The main paradox of the “U.S. ap-
proach”: On one side the United States 
press European allies to take over re-
sponsibility over their security and de-
fense and by the same mail, when Euro-
peans do steps in this direction Ameri-
cans are concerned about what they do. 
Correct me if I am wrong, but Ameri-
cans started to press the EU in after-
wards of Yugoslav crisis taunting Euro-
peans for their political mistakes in the 
former Yugoslavia following the fact that 
when time came to stop ethnic cleansing 
and violence in the Balkans the US 
shared 80 percent of the total costs of 
military operation. In afterwards, the EU 
Treaty of Nice of 2000 expanded the 
CFSP concept into the area of defense 
policy. When Europeans started to go in 
this direction and achieved some – not 
too big, but anyway some – progress 
over the last five years, Americans are 
afraid that EU could develop a separate 
defense structure out of NATO. Did 
Americans clearly understand what they 
want in this regard after Yugoslav cri-
sis?   
Second thesis/question mark 
Are questions concerning current transat-
lantic rift raised by and in Iraq? As to 
my understanding, – no – these are 
questions raised partly in Yugoslavia in 
1999 and partly by 11 September: role 
of the UN, non-5 Article crisis operation 
– in Yugoslavia NATO stopped to act as 
a coherent actor (and became for the 
first time a “coalition of willing”). On 
September 12th – when NATO for the 
first time in its history activated proce-
dure in accordance with the Article 5 of 
the Washington Treaty the U.S. did not 
make use of NATO as an instrument in 
fighting Taliban in Afganistan. In this 
logic September 11th has marginalized 
NATO. I think, Iraq just highlighted 
Yugoslav questions – it did not raise 
them. Trying to get answers in respect 
of current transatlantic dispute, we must 
answer Yugoslav questions of 1999 first.  
And we have to be open and frank – 
if this is the case that means that NATO 
is not adapted under new realities re-
gardless of what has been declared by 
all post-Yugoslav summits of Alliance. In 
Yugoslavia both U.S. and Europeans lost 
an important part of their common 
agendas. Iraqi crisis highlighted the fact 
of a lack of common agenda outside of 
Europe. Yugoslav questions highlighted 
much more important fact – a lack of 
common agenda inside of Europe. These 
questions must be answered first.  
Third thesis 
Following the above points it means that 
we have to define what NATO we want. 
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There are the following three basic op-
tions.   
1) Defence alliance and nothing more 
(this would mean that EU will not 
underway steps leading to building its 
separate defence structure) 
2) Defence alliance and European actor 
responsible for security and stability 
in Europe together with the EU with 
a clear distribution of roles and re-
sponsibilities so that both NATO and 
EU do not compete each other, 
and/or 
3) Defence alliance and global actor 
with a global responsibility (this op-
tion assumes that the EU resigns 
from its ambition to become a su-
perpower) 
In other words, we have to identify 
whether the U.S. and European allies do 
share common agendas in Europe and 
outside of Europe and whether as well 
as in which areas they are ready to act 
jointly. This is only a way leading to-
ward a real and common indeed for-
eign, security and defence policy of the 
EU and also dispersing a fog hiding its 
future. It is a general characteristic of 
the EU newcomers that they perceive 
both NATO and EU not as two separate 
coins but rather two sides of the same 
one coin.  
2) CFSP AND RUSSIA/EASTERN 
NEIGHBOURS 
Russia and the Ukraine were the first 
countries on which the EU passed the 
external relations Common Strategies – 
the new instruments of the CFSP estab-
lished by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which entered into force in May 1999, 
by the way, almost in the same time 
when NATO completed its military opera-
tion in former Yugoslavia.  
Likewise what concerns the EU “West-
ern agenda” the EU newcomers afford a 
new perception of its “Eastern agenda”. 
The way in which internal political proc-
esses in Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus 
are understand and perceived in Central 
Europe differs – due to a long historical, 
political and cultural experience – to a 
large extent from those of the ‘old’ 
Member States in Western Europe. Nev-
ertheless, it is the assessment of internal 
processes in place in Eastern European 
countries that plays a key role in deter-
mining the exact objectives and instru-
ments of EU foreign policy and relation-
ship developments towards Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. It is rea-
sonable, by all accounts, to expect the 
EU enlargement by Lithuania, Latvia, Es-
tonia, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary to 
have a direct impact on EU Eastern Pol-
icy. To what extent do the interests of 
the current and prospective new Member 
States differ one from another, especially 
in terms of the objectives and instru-
ments to be used to enhance relations 
towards the countries in Eastern Europe? 
There are several questions in this re-
spect. Let me limit myself on the follow-
ing three points/questions:  
First question 
Why has the EU adopted two separate 
Common Strategies on Russia and the 
Ukraine instead of just one Common 
Strategy on the CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States) or a region of East-
ern Europe? 
This is especially intriguing since the 
third Common Strategy passed by the EU 
was the Common Strategy on the Medi-
terranean Region covering twelve coun-
tries. This question might seem to be just 
rhetorical, but an individual approach to 
Russia and the Ukraine keeps the Union 
away from an adequate response to 
challenges arising within the strategic 
Russia-Belarus-Ukraine triangle in Eastern 
Europe. For example, an independent 
Ukraine has been said to represent an 
essential key to Europe’s stability and 
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security element, and the country “ex-
posed to Russian economic and political 
influence” in the EU Country Strategy 
Paper on the Ukraine. However, an indi-
vidual EU approach to Russia and the 
Ukraine prevents the Union from dealing 
with the mutual relations of these states, 
which is of essential importance for the 
stability of Europe. If a Regional Com-
mon Strategy on this issue were to be 
developed, the correlation within the 
Russia–Ukraine–Belarus triangle in East-
ern Europe could not be omitted. Why 
does the EU strategy deal with no ‘Rus-
sian influence on the Ukraine’ even 
though its independence is considered to 
be of key importance for the stability 
and security of the continent?  
Why has the European Union been 
marginalizing Russia’s support of semi-
democratic regimes in Eastern Europe? 
Russia’s support of the regime of Alex-
ander Lukashenko, the president of Bela-
rus, supported by Russia, is the most 
striking example. The EU has frozen its 
relationship with Belarus since 1997 as a 
result of the heavy-handed and un-
democratic conduct of the Minsk gov-
ernment. A number of similar occasions 
arose in the past when EU interests, 
such as the relationship towards semi-
democratic regimes in the former Yugo-
slavia region, and even Slovakia in 1994-
1998, differed profoundly from those of 
Russia. Even though Russia continues to 
support the present-day Minsk regime, 
this support is fully ignored by EU east-
ern policy and bilateral strategy building 
towards Russia. Why has this ‘gap’ oc-
curred in the EU eastern strategy? The 
CSP on Russia includes a statement say-
ing that “the EU seeks to cooperate with 
Russia in order to promote the democra-
tization of Belarus”, but there are no EU 
policy instruments to put such statement 
into practice.  
It is impossible to replace a complex 
EU regional strategy towards the Eastern 
European region with bilateral strategies 
towards particular countries in Eastern 
Europe. Owing to the lack of its regional 
approach, the EU will fail to give a clear 
response to questions relating to its in-
tended goals and the reasons behind 
them in Eastern Europe.  
Second question 
Why do the EU assessments of the politi-
cal systems in Russia and the Ukraine 
differ? 
The European Commission Communica-
tion on Conflict Prevention from April 
2001 defines the Country Strategy Paper 
as an instrument used to “analyze na-
tional conditions and use EU assistance 
for conflict prevention policies”. Since the 
end of 2001, CSP’s have foregone any 
TACIS Indicative Program providing 
grounds for the allocation of EU assis-
tance and its use by beneficiaries. Pursu-
ant to the CSP on Russia, any CSP is to 
establish: 1. Cooperation objectives, 2. 
The EU policy response and 3. Priority 
fields of cooperation.  
The CSP’s on Russia and the Ukraine 
present the political situations quite dif-
ferently. The assessment of Russia speaks 
of ‘political stability’, while in the 
Ukraine, the situation is said to be ‘weak 
and uncertain‘. Russia is defined as a 
consolidated ‘presidential democracy’ 
while the constitution of Ukraine is said 
to be ‘highly presidential’. Reading these 
statements for the first time, one can see 
they are quite controversial and unsub-
stantiated. The constitutions of these 
countries and Belarus are more or less 
of the same ‘high presidential’ nature, 
particularly in terms of the powers of 
the Head of State. Both the Russian and 
Ukrainian presidents are not only the 
chief national executives, but have, in 
fact, some partial legislative powers 
vested in the authority to issue presiden-
tial decrees enabling them to substitute 
laws passed by national parliaments. Both 
presidents keep the same strong-handed 
‘control’ over the national coalition and 
opposition activities and in the same de-
mocratic, or rather un-democratic man-
ner. Neither the presidents in Russia, nor 
the Ukraine, not to mention the president 
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of Belarus, suffer any inhibitions about 
misusing the so-called administrative re-
sources to ‘improve the morals’ of their 
political opposition and to gain control 
over the public and private media. The 
political systems in Russia and the 
Ukraine, which are not very clear -
pursuant to the EU assessment –, differ, 
de facto and de jure, in terms of de-
mocracy. The better image created by 
the current Russian president abroad, in 
comparison to the Ukrainian president, 
does not establish the political system in 
Russia as being significantly different 
than the one in the Ukraine or more 
democratic.  
The distinctions found in EU docu-
ments, which assess the political systems 
in these two countries, and which result 
in assistance programs redistributing 
hundreds of millions Euro’s each year 
are – least to say – inadequate. Why 
does the EU base its assistance strategies 
towards the countries in Eastern Europe 
on the ‘personal image’ of national lead-
ers instead of the Copenhagen criteria 
aimed at assessing the political transfor-
mation processes in post-communist 
countries in line with the assessment cri-
teria applied to Candidate Countries 
nowadays?  
Third question 
What are the EU goals in Russia and 
the Ukraine and to what extent do the 
cooperation and assistance programs 
meet them? 
The EU declares that it would like the 
countries in Eastern Europe to be estab-
lished as stable, open and pluralistic de-
mocracies; the EU strategies, however, 
fail to determine the instruments and 
policies to be used to help Moscow, Kiev 
and Minsk to reach such establishment.  
Pursuant to The European Union‘s 
Role in Promoting Human Rights and 
Democratization in the Third Countries 
(as of 8 May 2002), promoting human 
rights and democratization became high 
priority of EU external relations, and any 
assistance and enhancement programs 
relating to the third countries should fall 
under such priority. In the 1990s, the 
good governance principle became a high 
priority of the relationship towards the 
third countries. Pursuant to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam signed in 1997, and follow-
ing the advancement of the CSFP since 
1999, the EU perceivably has sought for 
a more ‘value-centred’ approach within 
its external policy; however, reality does 
not meet this purpose at all. The Treaty 
of Amsterdam of 1997, proclaimed hu-
man rights to be a cornerstone of the 
EU external policy. The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Human Rights followed the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, and the December 
2000 Summit in Nice declared it neces-
sary to harmonize EU external and in-
ternal policies. The TACIS assistance pro-
grams approved for Russia and the 
Ukraine for 2002 and 2003, however, 
gave no evidence that any cardinal 
changes have been made in the current 
good governance principle approach. 
According to the TACIS Indicative 
Program 2002–2003, Russia was to be 
granted assistance in the amount of EUR 
90 million in 2002, including EUR 15 
million to be used to promote the devel-
opment of a civil society. In 2003, the 
EU had to grant Russia up to EUR 94 
million while the support to be used to 
enhance the civil society was once again 
total EUR 15 million. The TACIS Program 
in 2002 granted Ukraine EUR 67 million, 
including EUR 8 million to be used for 
civil society development purposes. In 
2003, the Ukraine has received EUR 48 
million, including the same amount of 
EUR 8 million to be used to develop a 
civil society. Just like in the 1990’s the 
rest of the resources have been used in 
promoting good governance principles. 
With regard to the political situations in 
Russia and the Ukraine, this money, de 
facto, supported their state bureaucra-
cies, which is an essential instrument of 
a highly presidential system. Why does 
the EU believe that the post-soviet state 
bureaucracy will establish democratic, 
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open and pluralistic societies in Eastern 
Europe? Does not the structure of assis-
tance approved within the TACIS Indica-
tive Programs contradict the EU priority 
as to its external relations towards the 
third counties proclaimed in the EU 
Communication of May 8, 2001? 
An interesting paradox can be seen 
when observing the development of the 
EU approach towards Russia. In the 
1990s, the EU external assistance policy 
followed the November 28, 1991 Council 
Resolution – before the Treaty of Am-
sterdam came into force in 1999 – 
which responded to the breakdown of 
the Soviet Union and underlined the im-
portance of the good governance princi-
ple applied within the EU external assis-
tance policy. According to this Resolu-
tion, non-governmental organizations 
should be promoted in partnership coun-
tries in order to improve democratization 
processes there, but the NGOs used as 
the EU assistance root recipients only 
providing negotiations with their national 
governments had failed. In other words, 
the EU decided to favour the pragmatic 
good governance principle, or the exter-
nal partners’ stability, within its assis-
tance policy, while EU-Russia relations in 
1990 were, on the contrary, determined 
by strictly value politics matters – the 
response of the Russian government to 
the crisis in Chechnya is a particular 
example. Having passed the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the EU defined its promotion of 
democratization processes and human 
rights – value policy matters – in the 
third countries to be of the highest im-
portance within the CFSP. However, the 
EU assistance policy has not reflected 
such priorities at all since the TACIS as-
sistance programs passed for Russia and 
the Ukraine for 2002 – 2003 maintain 
the assistance allocation of 1990s. The 
paradox of such approach lies with the 
EU proclamation of its new ‘value-
centred’ relations and approach towards 
Russia to be applied since 1999, but its 
failure to change the old ‘pragmatic’ 
policy instruments. 
The tension between the good govern-
ance principle, or the enhancement of 
the stability of the post-communist re-
gimes, and the value politics, or the en-
hancement of the democratization proc-
esses and human rights in the countries 
concerned, can be easily discovered 
within the EU policy towards its partners 
from Eastern Europe since the beginning 
of 1990s. Neither the 1999 Common 
Strategies on Russia and the Ukraine, 
nor subsequent documents and political 
practices of the years that followed an-
swered the question of harmonizing these 
two EU policy principles, or the dilemma 
of which should be of the top priority. 
Until that happens, the Common Strate-
gies on Russia and the Ukraine will re-
main just well written compositions or 
wish lists failing to be turned into real 
EU policy strategies towards these coun-
tries. Without well-defined implementation 
instruments, a strategy ceases to be a 
strategy. 
The above are just few questions in 
respect of the both crucial Western and 
Eastern agendas of the enlarged EU that 
must to be answered provided that the 
enlarged EU or Europe of 25 wants to 
come ahead with its CFSP. 
 
* * * * * 
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THE EU’S EASTERN POLICY: A VISEGRÁD PERSPECTIVE 
Anita Orbán* 
                                          
* The Visegrád Institute 
A debate occupying the European Union 
for the past year and a half has centred 
on its policy toward its neighbours to 
the East following its 2004 enlargement 
but more importantly following the one 
in 2007. The dialogue remains at the 
preliminary stages for now, and there 
appear to be no foregone conclusions 
about where it will lead. The coming 
two years will provide Hungary with an 
opportunity to influence the Union's east-
ern policy in keeping with its own inter-
ests.  
The outlook for democratic transfor-
mation in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 
does not look good because the powers 
in those respective lands appear to be 
stopping at nothing to hold on to their 
own positions. The democratic forces in 
these countries would need as much 
backing from the West as possible if 
they are to stand a real chance of run-
ning against their political rivals, who 
also have the considerable resources of 
the state at their disposal. The situation 
has been made more complex by the 
fact that the Kremlin has been showing 
ever keener interest in these countries in 
recent years. Russia has been attempting 
gradually to regain influence in all three 
of these states. If Russia succeeds, it 
will, in all probability, lead to an export 
of the ever more autocratic Russian 
political model and the complete crushing 
of local democratic forces. This would 
certainly pose significant security risks 
for Hungary and the European Union. 
Should the political situation in the 
states on the EU's eastern frontier di-
verge dramatically from Union norms, 
those borders will become far less cross-
able than they have been for decades, 
making it much more difficult – among 
other things – for the nearly 200,000 
ethnic Hungarians living in Ukraine to 
maintain ties with their mother country.  
Among the documents to deal with 
the future direction of EU Eastern 
Europe policy, the March 2003 Commu-
nication of the Commission to the Coun-
cil, "Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: a 
new framework for relations with our 
Eastern and Southern Neighbours", is of 
great interest to Hungary and other 
countries on the eve of their accession. 
The document refers to Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova and Russia but also includes 
the countries of the Southern Mediterra-
nean region: Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Jor-
dan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Pales-
tinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia.  
The aim of the Wider Europe concept 
is to surround the EU with a ring of 
friendly states. Toward this end, the Un-
ion would open up its markets more to 
these neighbouring countries and facili-
tate the free movement of goods, ser-
vices, people and capital between the EU 
and its neighbours. At the same time, 
the New Neighbourhood policy rules out 
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the possibility of the countries affected 
becoming EU members in the middle 
term. As Commissioner Chris Patten 
noted, "Over the past decade, the Un-
ion's most successful foreign policy in-
strument has undeniably been the prom-
ise of EU membership. This is not sus-
tainable. For the coming decade, we 
need to find new ways to export the 
stability, security and prosperity we have 
created within the enlarged EU." 
This concept has presented several 
problems for Hungary, Poland and 
Lithuania. The notion of a Wider Europe 
lumps Eastern European countries to-
gether with states of the Southern Medi-
terranean region. Brussels expressly ruled 
out the possibility of EU membership for 
countries in Northern Africa and the 
Middle East. Although the possibility of 
accession is not ruled out for the East-
ern European states, the mid-range plan 
does not even discuss it. Regrettably, 
lumping the region together with the 
Southern Mediterranean states may 
eliminate even the long-range possibility 
of accession. It is certainly conceivable 
that the EU plans to adapt the policy it 
has used with the North African and 
Middle Eastern states to its evolving rela-
tions with our eastern neighbours, i.e. to 
aim for 'deepened co-operation' instead 
of 'integration'. Losing the possibility of 
accession, however, may bring about a 
further weakening of the democratic op-
position in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 
and an orienting of those countries to-
ward Moscow.  
It is not in Hungary's interests for the 
EU's eastern frontier to become perma-
nent in 2007. One, it would make it 
difficult for the Hungarian minority in 
Ukraine to maintain ties with the mother 
country. Two, the gap in the political 
and economic situation in states within 
the Union and in those without would 
grow even larger, possibly leading to 
regional instability. In order to prevent 
this, Budapest must attempt to change 
the Wider Europe concept in at least 
two areas:  
* The Eastern European states must be 
treated separately from the Southern 
Mediterranean region. A distinct policy 
for Eastern Europe is necessary 
whether this is a part of the Wider 
Europe concept or not. 
* The document must be more open on 
the matter of future EU membership 
for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, 
and this possibility must be made an 
express part of the concept. 
In addition to impacting the New 
Neighbourhood policy, Hungary, Poland 
and Lithuania will have a say in the al-
location of related resources as well. 
Approved in July 2003, a document enti-
tled "Paving the way for a New 
Neighbourhood Instrument" recommends 
that the Union should only plan its long-
term assistance programmes for Eastern 
Europe after 2007. Thus, 2004–2007 
will represent a trial period based on 
which long-range programmes will be 
developed.  
To the extent that Hungary wishes to 
influence the EU's eastern policy, the 
next two years will be the time to act. 
If Budapest can put forward specific 
proposals and take an active part in 
evaluating other New Neighbourhood pol-
icy initiatives, it will certainly have a 
hand in forming long-term eastern policy 
after 2007. 
* * * * * 
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EU—RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE ENLARGEMENT: 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
Elena Klitsounova* 
                                          
* Centre for Integration Research & Projects (CIRP), St Petersburg 
The expansion of the European Union is 
fundamentally changing the face of the 
region. Its transformative effects expand 
far beyond the borders of the EU and 
range across a great number of policy 
areas. Neither Euro-optimists nor Euro-
sceptics question the fact that future of 
Europe depends on what policies of co-
operation between (old and new) EU 
members and their (old and new) 
neighbours will be developed in the com-
ing years.  
Focusing my remarks on the state of 
Russian relations towards the EU, I 
would like to suggest that future of 
Europe in large part depends on what 
policies of cooperation between Russia 
and the enlarged EU will be developed. 
Despite many positive trends currently 
taking place in the EU—Russian rela-
tions, there still remains a sound possi-
bility that coming years will witness the 
suspension of the EU—Russian strategic 
partnership. What and why may go 
wrong? What is Russia’s policy on coop-
eration with the EU?  
In the late 1990s, the Russian leader-
ship declared that it had made a “Euro-
pean choice” and viewed EU—Russian 
relations as a “strategic partnership”. 
Yet, the path of development towards 
this declaration provides much material 
for thinking on the complicated nature 
of the EU—Russian partnership.  
For a long time the Russians debated 
their place in post-cold Europe without 
paying an adequate attention to the 
process of widening and deepening of 
the EU. On the one hand, the Russian 
official discourse presented the EU exclu-
sively in favourable light, and this politi-
cal admiration of the EU for a long time 
represented a sharp contrast to the Rus-
sian attitudes towards NATO, which was 
still met with continuous mistrust and 
annoyance. On the other hand, only lim-
ited political attention was given to the 
EU-related issues. If one follows the Rus-
sian Duma debates, the speeches of 
President Yeltsin, statements by Russian 
policy-makers, it is easy to observe that 
the EU and its enlargement were hardly 
mentioned. In the 1990s, the discourse 
on the EU was neither dominant nor 
prominent among Russian political dis-
courses. The EU issue acquired neither 
attention from Russian state agencies nor 
a considerable endorsement by various 
interest groups. As a result, very little 
work was made to design a sound strat-
egy to deal with new challenges and op-
portunities posed by the European inte-
gration. Although there was a broad 
range of objectives enumerated under the 
slogan of EU—Russian partnership, Rus-
sian official documents did not reflect 
any clear strategy and prioritization of 
action in different issue-areas. Summing 
up, the first decade of EU—Russian rela-
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tionship was characterized by the rela-
tively weak profile of the EU in the Rus-
sian foreign policy thinking coupled with 
the lack of any strategic substance in the 
dialogue between the two parties.  
The beginning of the 21st century was 
marked by a significant revival of EU—
Russian relations. Moreover, Russia’s 
European discourse and policy changed 
considerably during the Putin’s presi-
dency. Russia’s current national idea, as 
expressed by president Putin and his 
administration, is modernization and 
competitiveness of Russian economy. This 
reframed the Russian discussion on the 
EU in new terms: Russia’s European pol-
icy seems to be very much understood in 
terms of promoting Russian development 
goals; the forging EU—Russian relations 
is presented as vital to achieving Russia’s 
modernization and Russia’s competitive-
ness in a globalizing world. Conse-
quently, the EU has become a constant 
theme in Russian official discourse, and 
Russian policy-makers have begun taking 
a more assertive role with regard to 
Russia’s partnership with the EU. There 
are very positive signs that the Russian 
leadership has been willing to advance 
Russia’s partnership with the European 
Union much farther and much faster 
since Putin’s policy towards the EU has 
been an interrelated part of a larger 
enterprise – Putin’s “Russian project”. 
Serious attempts have been made to 
identify areas of practical cooperation 
with the EU, to develop initiatives with 
concrete instruments, financing, and con-
tent which would go beyond the realm 
of “virtual” cooperation. Several sectoral 
cooperation initiatives were launched – 
ranging from the energy dialogue 
through ecology and security to home 
affairs.  
In the beginning of the new millen-
nium, Russia, together with the EU, 
seems to be encouraged by the idea of 
creating several “common European pol-
icy spaces”, notably for economics, edu-
cation and research, justice and home 
affairs, and external security. This looks 
like excellent building blocks for a 
“Wider Europe” policy that would mini-
mize the new division lines between the 
enlarging EU and Russia. Naturally, the 
extent to which such initiatives can be 
utilized depends on political will and re-
sources of both Russia and the EU. The 
EU—Russian partnership, already rich in 
twists and paradoxes, is still work-in-
progress.  
The current agenda of the EU—
Russian partnership is full of the ques-
tions of strategic choice, including, for 
Russia, whether and to what extent it is 
willing and able to Europeanize itself, i.e. 
to converge on modern European values 
and standards; whether it is willing and 
able to be part of EU Neighbourhood 
Policy.  
The problem seems to be that until 
now neither Russia nor the EU have in-
vested much effort in finding clear an-
swers to these questions.  
With regard to Russia, it is vital to 
note that the very fact that Russia does 
not aim at joining the EU as a member-
state means that it has, in principle, to 
formulate a very complicated “policy-
mix” between two opposite set of policies 
– those focused on involvement in and 
those aiming at exclusion from the EU 
affairs. To find an accurate balance be-
tween strategies of inclusion/exclusion 
would require much work. It is obvious 
that Russia’s cooperation with the EU has 
gained more importance during the 
Putin’s presidency. It is less obvious to 
what extent new initiatives can be suc-
cessfully implemented. The critical issue 
is whether Russia will go beyond diplo-
matic declarations to the point of orga-
nizing a real convergence of interests 
and political norms and values with the 
European Union. The answer to this 
question is not yet clear. 
 To be able to profit from partner-
ship with the EU, Russia must continue 
to reform itself. From this perspective, a 
Russia’s serious engagement with the EU 
is far more than a policy specifically lim-
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ited to one – economic or political – 
dimension; it is profound transformation 
extending to politics, economics, and so-
cial life. Yet, the questions remain to 
what extent the interrelates goals of 
partnership with the EU and profound 
domestic transformation are supported 
by various interest groups in Russia; to 
what extent these goals are seen by gen-
eral Russian public as both realistic and 
desirable enough to provide sufficiently 
strong support for Russian European 
policy.  
Two points are worth mentioning 
here. First, in contemporary Russia, the 
European project seems to be an elitist 
project put forward by the supreme 
Russian state leadership and repeatedly 
advocated by a small number of policy 
experts. So far, little has been done to 
positively translate this project into the 
life terms of Russian general public. On 
the one hand, there seems to be few 
Russians who are overtly antagonistic to 
integration with Europe. On the other 
hand, the EU and all it implies have 
been relatively uninteresting to many in 
Russia. In practice this means that due 
to a lack of strong domestic pressure 
for speedy integration with the EU, Rus-
sian policy-makers seem to have been 
working with no set deadlines.  
Second, the price that Russia should 
pay for its deeper integration with the 
EU is not necessarily an appealing pros-
pect to Russian elites since Russia’s Eu-
ropeanization is likely to challenge many 
of Russian political institutions and prac-
tices. The way the European question has 
played out in contemporary Russia seems 
to be the product of the interplay of 
purely economic than broader political 
interests. The rise of new economic elites 
is one of the main driving forces behind 
new Russian policy towards the EU, and 
Russia’s relations with the EU seems to 
be rather interest-driven than value-
driven process. In this “economized” 
worldview, EU—Russian partnership 
means that the EU accepts Russia as an 
equal partner as it is, without paying 
much attention to Russian internal politi-
cal development. This is evident from the 
tendency towards “economization” of the 
European issue, which makes the major-
ity of Russian initiatives towards the EU 
specifically limited to economic aspects. 
In this context, the Russian leadership 
has been in a very controversial situa-
tion: on the one hand, it claims its ea-
gerness to stay in the general framework 
of cooperation with the EU; on the other 
hand, it seems to lack the long-term 
strategy on adjusting to existing rules 
and values of the EU.  
To analyze the complexities of Rus-
sia—EU relations also requires a more 
subtle and complex account of Russian 
and EU relations towards the countries 
in between the borders of the Russian 
Federation and the enlarging EU. It is 
especially true given that (1) Russia has 
been more and more involved in new 
integration processes within the CIS area 
and (2) the EU is gradually shifting its 
focus from the Enlargement issues to the 
“Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” Policy, 
which is likely to involve a significant 
measure of economic and political rela-
tionship with post-communist states.  
With the EU borders pushed east-
ward, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and 
countries of the southern Caucasus will 
be “nearby foreign countries” for both 
Russia and the enlarged European Union. 
As a result, patterns of interdependence 
between Russia, the EU, and their post-
Soviet neighbours are likely to be al-
tered, and new different opportunities to 
manage these relations will arise. This 
called for new policies on the behalf of 
both Russia and the EU. In this context, 
the questions of strategic choice are as 
follows: 
* for the EU, whether it is willing and 
able to develop a coherent Neighbour-
hood Policy and to wrap into this pol-
icy everything related to the European 
Union’s relationship with the rest of 
the continent;  
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* for Russia, whether and to what ex-
tent it is willing and able to combine 
the two elements of Russian foreign 
policy, namely strategic partnership 
with the EU and Russian effort on es-
tablishing a common economic zone 
and a regional security framework 
with some post-Soviet states; whether 
it is willing and able to coordinate its 
“CIS policy” with EU Neighbourhood 
Policy; whether it is willing and able 
to be part of EU Neighbourhood Pol-
icy.  
Certainly, to answer these questions 
would require much work. It would also 
require much work to reconcile diver-
gent interests and approaches. Until now 
there have been many interpretations of 
the EU Neighbourhood initiatives, includ-
ing serious disappointments since Ukraine 
and Moldova argue for more clearly-
defined perspectives of EU membership 
and the South Caucasus states wish to 
be included as the policy’s clients. There 
are also indications that some Russian 
policy-makers are concerned that coming 
years will witness the rise of direct EU—
Russia rivalry in the “overlapping near 
abroad” and this may cause the incorpo-
ration of the philosophy of dividing lines 
(between Europe and “non-European” 
Russia) into the Neighbourhood initiatives. 
Indeed, serious reasons for such a pes-
simistic prognosis can be found by look-
ing, for instance, at Poland’s stand on 
the Eastern Dimension which seems to be 
torn between constructing dimensionalism 
as a form of postmodern networked po-
litical space and (re)constructing state-
centred landscapes, centuries-long rival-
ries, and hierarchically established rela-
tions. Summing up, in what is going on 
under the positively-looking façade of the 
“Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” rela-
tions one could notice the existence of 
the complex and interdependent problems 
and challenges.  
It is clear that neither the EU can ig-
nore Russian vision of its neighbourhoods 
nor Russia can afford to ignore the 
gradual emergence of EU “Wider Europe 
– Neighbourhood” Policy. The problem is 
that until now neither Russia no the EU 
have invested much effort in building up 
policies on new neighbours’ cooperation. 
With regard to Russia, it is easy to ob-
serve that designing the policy over the 
EU Neighbourhood initiatives does not 
belong to the list of Russian high priori-
ties, and Russia appears to have kept 
aloof from the Wider Europe – 
Neighbourhood debates.  
It is important to examine the reasons 
for this lack of interest in discussing 
new challenges and opportunities posed 
by the EU Neighbourhood initiatives. It is 
also important to note that since the 
“Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” Policy 
is not yet a well established program, 
Russia still has an opportunity to deter-
mine (to some extent) the character of 
this policy and incorporate in it some of 
Russian needs. It is even more important 
to understand that, assuming the com-
plexity involved in designing new 
neighbourhood policies, one key to suc-
cess is to find linked interests and 
shared objectives for Russia, (old and 
new) EU members and their (old and 
new) neighbours. 
 
* * * * * 
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POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA  
AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC: OR THERE AND BACK AGAIN? 
Petr Kratochvíl* 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is twofold The 
main bulk of the paper presents an 
analysis of the latest development in the 
political relations between Russia and the 
Czech Republic (CR) and make some 
remarks about the future prospects. Sec-
ondly, I also shortly address a more ab-
stract question of why the improvement 
in the Czech–Russian relations has been 
much slower than in the case of Polish–
Russian or Hungarian–Russian relations.  
At the very beginning I should correct 
a false assumption which may stem from 
a mistaken interpretation of the title of 
my paper: I do not intend to simply re-
iterate the conventional wisdom among 
Czech analysts and policy-makers who, 
when asked the classical Chernyshevski´s 
question “kto vinovat?“, often insist that 
only and exclusively Russia is to blame 
for the failure to establish normal rela-
tions between the two countries. I will, 
quite to the contrary, try to show that 
neither side pursued a cooperative ap-
proach in the past years. 
To begin let us remind us that, his-
torically speaking, the relations between 
the Russian Empire and the Czechs were 
harmonious, albeit sometimes overly ide-
alized: The Russian Empire was often 
portrayed as the ultimate defender of the 
freedom of Slavic nations oppressed by 
the German, Austrian or Turkish rulers. 
At the time of the Czech National Re-
vival, Russia was regarded the natural 
ally of the Czechs aiming at self-
determination.1 Only after the communist 
coup d’état, this attitude began to 
change. But the deadly blow to the al-
ready worsening relations was dealt with 
the 1968 invasion of Warsaw Treaty ar-
mies.2 Regardless of the tragic nature of 
the Soviet invasion, we might assume 
that there had not been much negative 
experience with Russians prior to 1948 
and that, therefore, the return to normal 
relations after the end of the Cold War 
could be more swift in the case of the R 
than in that of Hungary or even Poland 
with its long history of deep-rooted aver-
sion. 
Surprisingly enough, this was not the 
case. The return to normalcy took no 
less than ten years. The Czech foreign 
policy towards Russia after 1993 can be 
roughly divided into three stages with 
different levels of interaction and differ-
ent attitudes towards the Eastern giant.3 
This is illustrated in Table 1. 
                                          
1 Cf. Štindl, Karel. Rusko a střední Evropa. Mez-
inárodní politika. 5/2000 
2 For a similar account of the transformation of 
the Russian–Czech relations see Sokolov, Maksim. 
Jazycheskoye pokayanie. Izvestia.ru. 
http://www.izvestia.ru/sokolov/article37422 
3 I start my analysis in 1993 when Czechoslova-
kia split. 
* Institute of International Relations, Prague 
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Table 1 
Czech foreign policy towards Russia 
 
 Russia as a 
threat 
Russia as a 
partner 
Frequent references Stage I 
(1993–1996) 
 
Rare references 
Stage II 
(1997–1999) 
Stage III 
(2000–….) 
 
Each of the stages shown in the table 
is characterized by a different pattern of 
Czech behaviour towards Russia. In the 
first stage, the country’s main target was 
the “return to Europe”, meaning both 
joining the European Union and NATO. 
The fear of unstable Russia was often 
seen as one of the main driving forces. 
The second stage started approximately 
at the time when it was already sure 
enough for the CR that it would join 
both organizations in nearest future. 
Russia, though still considered rather as 
a threat than as a partner or an oppor-
tunity, virtually vanished from the Czech 
foreign political agenda. Only in the 
third stage, Russia emerged as a country 
the Czech government dealt seriously 
with but still the attention given to Rus-
sia has lagged far behind both Western 
Europe and Central European space. 
We easily draw a similar table that 
reflects Russian foreign policy towards 
the Czech Republic. (Table 2) 
Table 2 
Russian foreign policy towards the CR 
 
Stage Predominant behaviour 
Stage I (1993–1996) Political pressure 
Stage II (1997–1999) Lack of interest 
Stage III (2000–…) Construction of a nor-mal relation 
 
 
Before Stage I 
Shortly after the fall of communism, both 
the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia had 
similar ideas: A well-known example is 
President Havel’s famous proposal to dis-
solve not only the Warsaw Treaty but 
also NATO.1 Similarly, both countries be-
lieved that OSCE would be the best 
guarantee of security in Europe. 
Whereas Havel and other representatives 
of the Czech foreign policy elite dropped 
these ideas well before the split of 
Czechoslovakia, the very same ideas (e.g. 
the OSCE as the corner stone of the 
European security architecture) remained 
key pillars of the nascent Russian foreign 
policy towards the West. Even the pro-
Western Foreign Minister Kozyrev be-
lieved that NATO expansion would have 
serious repercussions for Russia and 
should be replaced with strengthening 
the OSCE or with “cross security” guar-
antees for Central Europeans from NATO 
and from Russia. 
Stage I 
At the beginning of Stage I, the main 
political and security issue between the 
two countries was the question of NATO 
enlargement. The growing disillusionment 
of Moscow with the US plans for NATO 
enlargement which became visible already 
in 1993 and even more so after the re-
lease of the NATO enlargement study in 
1995, was coupled with ever more ve-
hement Czech demands for NATO mem-
bership. Although the West tried to 
soothe Russia through the 1994 Partner-
ship for Peace, a short glance at Czech 
media reports presents a different pic-
ture: NATO membership was clearly un-
derstood as a safeguard against the de-
stabilization coming from the East.2 Three 
events were typically mentioned in this 
context: the unsuccessful coup of 1991, 
Yeltsin´s handling the Parliament during 
the hot autumn 1993 and, later, also the 
war in Chechnya was added to the list 
of dangers lurking in the East. 
                                          
1 Cf. Prezident Václav Havel a NATO. Radio Pra-
gue, http://www.radio.cz/cz/html/nato_havel.html 
2 Cf. Běloševský, Dmitrij: Česká republika v ruské 
zahrani n politické reflexi 90. let. 
http://veda.fsv.cuni.cz/konf_sem/globalni_svet/GS_p
rispevky/gs_ter_belosevsky.htm  
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On the other side, Russian diplomacy 
was forced to make a fundamentally im-
portant choice that would pre-determine 
the future development in the mutual 
relation between the CR and Russia for 
several years: either to acquiesce to the 
NATO enlargement plans and thus im-
prove its relations to the candidates for 
NATO membership, or to run into heavy 
opposition which would inevitably lead to 
tenser relations with the candidate coun-
tries. Although the Russian reaction var-
ied from time to time, the overall Rus-
sian stance was closer to the latter al-
ternative.  
Stage II 
Since 1997 there were signs indicating a 
gradual change in the troubled relation-
ship: The first reason for this shift was 
the final decision about NATO enlarge-
ment. The Founding Act on Mutual Rela-
tions, Cooperation and Security between 
NATO and the Russian Federation also 
helped to alleviate Russian fears of an 
enemy ante portas.1 To assume that the 
improved overall conditions would also 
move both sides to set aside their old 
differences would be, however, totally 
wrong. Russia gradually weakened its 
political pressure on the CR but a 
warming up of the bilateral relations did 
not follow the move. Instead, Russian 
foreign policy effectively overlooked the 
CR on the political map of Europe. This 
lead some Czech analysts to believe that 
“after the definitive decision about our 
joining the Alliance Russia adopted a 
posture of insulted frostiness towards the 
CR and systematically blocked the devel-
opment of mutual relations for several 
years.”2  
In similar vein, the CR, now firmly 
anchored in the western alliance, did not 
                                          
1 NATO On-line Library, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm  
2 Cf. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Duleba, Póti, Votápek 
(eds.): Eastern Policy of the Enlarged European 
Union: Developing Relations with Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus. A Visegrád Perspective. Slovak For-
eign Policy Association, Bratislava, 2003 
make a single friendly move the over-
come the stalemate. To the contrary, it 
played its old game of describing Russia 
as the archenemy of the free, democratic 
world. This aspect of Czech foreign pol-
icy was so evident that some politicians 
from neighbouring countries warned 
against undue anti-Russian sentiments 
that effectively prevented the new NATO 
member states from creating normal re-
lations to Russia.3 
Stage III 
The beginning of Stage III was marked 
by Putin’s ascension to power. Putin’s 
pragmatism laid particular emphasis on 
multidirectional diplomacy with good re-
lations to every part of the world, espe-
cially in economic terms. After the Alli-
ance enlargement in spring 1999, seem-
ingly less controversial topics were al-
lowed to gain more prominence. One of 
them was the abolishment of visa-free 
regime and the other payment of the 3.5 
billion USD debt. Although the end of 
visa-free travel by the end of May 2000 
caused some problems to Russian side, 
the move had some positive side effects. 
First of all, both sides were forced to 
communicate with each other and inter-
ests of both compelled them to looking 
for a solution, which would (a) be in 
accordance with the requirements of the 
European Union and (b) make as little 
damage to the bilateral relations as pos-
sible. Similarly, the discussion about the 
restructuring and payment of Russia’s 
debt to the CR showed the willingness of 
both sides to move ahead with the solu-
tion of this old issue.  
The intensification of political dialogue 
started even before the question of the 
mounting Russian debt was settled. In 
February 2001, Russian foreign minister 
Igor Ivanov paid an official visit to Pra-
gue and although he spent there only 
several hours, his visit gave rise to bold 
                                          
3 Cf. Kotyk, Václav: Jak přistupovat k politickému 
dialogu se současným Ruskem. Mezinárodní 
politika, 4/2001.  
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predictions of “a return of Russia to the 
Czech Republic”.1 A whole series of visits 
followed during the next two years: In 
January 2002, Czech Foreign Minister 
Kavan visited Moscow and in April Rus-
sia hosted Czech Prime Minister Zeman. 
As representatives of Czech Social De-
mocratic Party, both ministers were well 
disposed towards Russia. They repeatedly 
expressed their support for closer coop-
eration of NATO and Russia2 and Rus-
sian diplomats appreciated this gesture 
as Czech President Havel constantly re-
jected closer relations of Russia with 
NATO or even further institutionalization 
of the relationship. 
Last year, the new Foreign Minister 
Svoboda visited Russia, and in autumn, 
Czech President Václav Klaus, elected in 
March 2003, also paid a visit to Mos-
cow. The success of his journey was 
granted because of two simple reasons: 
First, former President Havel hesitated to 
visit Russia and so an official visit in the 
very year when the new President came 
to power was greatly appreciated. Sec-
ondly, Havel often criticized Russian mili-
tary actions in Chechnya and shortly be-
fore the end of his presidential term, he 
stated that Russia was not a European 
country.3 Klaus´s visit to Russia may be 
the final step to normalization of the 
mutual relation and it is not by chance 
that Foreign Minister Svoboda declared 
                                          
1 Rossiya vernulas´ v Chekhiyu: bol´shoy brat 
vspomnil o svoich sosedyach. 17 February 2001, 
LentaRu, http://www.lenta.cz/0102/05ivanov.htm 
2 Jan Kavan: „My ne opasayemsya sblizheniya 
NATO s Rossiyey.“ Izvestiya.Ru, 
http://izvestia.ru/article13171 or O peregovorakh 
Predsedatelya Pravitel´stva Rossiyi M.M. 
Kas´yanova s prem´yer-ministrom Chekhiyi M. 
Zemanom. Soobshchenye press-sluzhby 
Pravitel´stva Rossiyskoy Federaciyi, 
http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-
reuro.nsf/strana?OpenView&Start=30&Count=30&E
xpand=35#35  
3 Vaclav Klaus peresporil Vaclava Gavela: 
Prezident Chekhiyi dokazal, tshto s Rossiyey nuz-
hno imet´ delo. Vremya novostey, 3 November 
2003, 
http://www.vremya.ru/2003/206/5/84009.html 
the current stage of “the Russian—Czech 
ties the best in the last ten years.”4 
Why so late? 
The final question to be answered is why 
the relation between Russia and CR has 
needed so much time for normalization? 
We can identify at least two kinds of 
factors, which we provisionally label as 
material and sociological. Let us first 
tackle the material factors: The most 
striking difference in geographical posi-
tion compared to other Visegrád coun-
tries is that the CR does not share a 
common border with neither the Russian 
Federation itself nor with any other post-
Soviet country (e.g. Ukraine). Therefore, 
if we speak about the Eastern policy of 
the CR, we might as well mean the 
Czech policy to other Visegrád countries. 
An Eastern policy towards Russia has 
been, strictly speaking, non-existent with 
the sole exception of the early 1990s. 
The geographical position was probably 
one of the very reasons for this defi-
ciency. 
The group of sociological factors is 
undoubtedly more comprehensive. First of 
all, the Czech Republic and its political 
elite in the 1990s took greater pains 
than any other post-communist country 
to return to Europe and even to erase 
the mere memory of the communist past. 
Thus, it often accentuated its exceptional-
ity and rejected deeper engagement of 
the country elsewhere than in the West. 
Secondly, internal political situation also 
exerted considerable influence on the 
country’s foreign policy orientation. The 
pro-Russian Communist Party has not, 
unlike other communist parties in the 
region, reformed itself. In consequence, 
all other relevant political parties in the 
CR rejected to share power with com-
munists who were thus forced to con-
stant anti-systemic opposition. However, 
their popularity has risen steadily, Com-
                                          
4 Cirill Svoboda: „Nashi otnosheniya – nay-
lutschiye za posledniye 10 let“. Izvestiya.Ru, 25 
April 2003, http://izvestia.ru/politic/article33160 
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munist Party now ranking only second in 
election polls. On the other hand, post-
communists in other Visegrád countries 
were strong enough to come to power 
and thus soften their country’s stance 
towards Russia. 
CONCLUSION 
Let us summarize the most important 
conclusions of this paper: Although 
rather belatedly, the CR has finally suc-
ceeded in normalizing its relations with 
Russia. It would be ominous to blame 
just one of the two partners for the 
failure to construct a normal partnership 
earlier in the 1990s. While Russia was 
fiercely opposed to Czech NATO acces-
sion, the CR on its part ignored Russia 
or focused solely on its actions in 
Chechnya without giving it a chance to 
develop a constructive relation. Only af-
ter the final decision about Czech mem-
bership in the Alliance and de-
ideologization of Russian foreign policy 
with Putin’s rise to power, the situation 
began to change slowly. This trend was 
accelerated when new and old issues 
alike had to be solved such as the intro-
duction of visa regime or the issue of 
Russia’s debt to the CR. The future of 
Russian–Czech relations seems therefore 
if not bright then at least more promis-
ing than the time of the “cold peace” in 
the second half of the 1990s. 
 
* * * * * 
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PART TWO  
SHADOW ECONOMY AND CORRUPTION 
 
ТЕНЕВАЯ ЭКОНОМИКА РОССИИ И ПУТИ ЕЕ ОГРАНИЧЕНИЯ 
Глинкина Светлана Павловна* 
                                          
* Institute for International Economic and Political Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences 
Значительная часть (по разным оценкам, 
от 25 до 50%) российской экономики 
находится сегодня «в тени». Легализация 
бизнеса и его декриминализация – важная 
задача современного этапа развития 
общества. Как показывают имеющиеся 
расчеты, декриминализация экономики 
может обеспечить рост производства 
более, чем на 20%. 
Что значит декриминализировать 
экономику? 
Эта задача не сводится исключительно к 
вытеснению организованной 
преступности из всех сфер делового 
оборота (такое понимание лежит в основе 
разрабатываемой МВД РФ Комплексной 
программы декриминализации 
территорий и крупнейших объектов 
экономики). Ведь теневая экономика 
сегодня – это не только и не столько 
совокупность форм хозяйства и секторов 
экономики, противостоящих государству 
и легальным сегментам рынка 
(производство и сбыт наркотиков, 
незаконная торговля оружием, 
проституция, рэкет и т.д.). Это 
совокупность отношений, присущих на 
современном этапе всем без исключения 
секторам экономики и, следовательно, 
декриминализировать экономику – это 
значит повысить на порядок прозрачность 
ведения бизнеса и корпоративного 
управления.  
Легализация и декриминализация 
российского бизнеса требуют реализации 
программы, конечной целью которой 
должно стать обеспечение 
взаимовыгодного контракта между 
государством и бизнесом, в соответствии 
с которым стороны берут на себя и строго 
выполняют следующие обязательства. 
Бизнес разворачивает общественно 
полезную экономическую деятельность, 
не уходя от выполнения фискальных 
обязательств. Государство – обеспечивает 
предпринимателям разумную «цену 
вхождения на рынок», защиту прав 
собственности и соблюдение контрактов, 
достойное социальное обеспечение 
граждан. 
Совершенно очевидно, что 
экономические преступления будут 
существовать до тех пор, пока в 
результате нарушения условий контракта 
(взятых на себя обязательств) одна из 
сторон получает большую выгоду, чем в 
случае выполнения контракта, и при этом 
санкции за нарушения обязательств не 
исчерпывают ожидаемого прироста 
прибыльности. 
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Следовательно, контракт должен быть 
дополнен механизмом выявления и 
наказания фактов его не соблюдения. 
Очевидно, что эффективность действия 
такого механизма будет зависеть от 
четкости и однозначности проработки 
законов, принципиальной возможности 
(наличие соответствующих кадров, 
финансовых и технических средств) 
выявления правонарушений и 
обеспечения возможностей применения 
санкций ко всем участникам 
правонарушения, независимо от их 
социального статуса и материального 
положения. 
Исходя из сказанного, в целях 
легализации находящейся сегодня в 
«тени» экономики и декриминализации 
бизнеса можно предложить следующие 
практические шаги. 
1) СОВЕРШЕНСТВОВАНИЕ СИСТЕМЫ 
НАЛОГООБЛОЖЕНИЯ  
Глобализация практически снимает 
национальные границы производства. 
При этом сохраняются существенные 
различия в ставках налогообложения 
доходов в разных странах. В таким 
условиях у предпринимателей, 
объективно заинтересованных в 
минимизации своих издержек путем 
ухода от налогов, существуют реальные 
легальные возможности решать эти 
задачи, используя имеющиеся в мировой 
практике институциональные формы (в 
частности, оффшорные зоны). 
Чтобы противостоять такой ситуации 
потребуется: 
* обеспечить перенос тяжести 
налогообложения с доходов, 
получаемых от трудовой, 
инновационной и инвестиционной 
деятельности, на налогообложение 
рентных доходов от эксплуатации 
природных ресурсов, доходов от 
собственности, а также доходов от 
деятельности, связанной с 
негативными экологическими и 
социальными последствиями. Базой 
налогообложения должны стать не 
результаты производства, а ресурсы, 
находящиеся в пользовании того или 
иного предприятия, и последствия его 
деятельности, наносящие вред 
обществу;  
* свести к минимуму возможности ухода 
от налогообложения, совершенствуя 
законодательство в области 
трансфертных цен (при использовании 
трансфертных цен бремя 
доказательства того, что 
экономическая деятельность при 
осуществлении заключенных сделок 
действительно имела место, должно 
лежать на налогоплательщике); ввести 
налог на платежи в оффшорные 
центры со значительно повышенной 
ставкой; не придерживаться 
соглашений об избежании двойного 
налогообложения, если «природа» 
дохода связана с пагубной налоговой 
конкуренцией. 
* ввести режим, при котором 
резидентные компании должны 
информировать национальные 
налоговые ведомства о своих 
международных сделках и операциях 
за рубежом.  
Предлагаемые меры полностью 
согласуются с предложениями экспертов 
ОЭСР по борьбе с «пагубной налоговой 
конкуренцией». 
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2) ЛИКВИДАЦИЯ 
ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ И 
АДМИНИСТРАТИВНЫХ БАРЬЕРОВ 
ВЫХОДА ПРЕДПРИЯТИЙ НА 
РОССИЙСКИЙ РЫНОК  
Хотя процедуры лицензирования 
экономических субъектов в России 
отличаются от региона к региону, в 
среднем новый заявитель должен обойти 
20-30 учреждений и получить 50-90 
утвержденных регистрационных форм. 
Для того чтобы начать новое дело, нужно 
получить около 30 различных видов 
лицензий. Согласно обследованию 
Всемирного Банка – РАН, 12% 
предприятий показали, что в 1999 г. они 
подавали заявку на получение новой 
лицензии, но им в ней было отказано. 
Тридцать четыре процента 
обследованных фирм показали, что они 
были вынуждены получить лицензию, 
которая, по их мнению, законодательно 
не требовалась, а 13% показали, что их 
предприятия заплатили лицензионный 
сбор свыше установленного размера. В 
среднем для организации небольшого 
предприятия в Москве требуется в четыре 
раза больше времени, чем в Варшаве, при 
этом российский малый и средний бизнес 
подвергается в два раза большему числу 
проверок.  
Необходимо существенное сужение 
числа видов деятельности, основанных на 
разрешительном, а не уведомительном 
принципе, сокращение числа разного рода 
проверок предприятий, упрощение 
системы бухгалтерского учета, активная 
борьба с коррупцией. 
3) СОЗДАНИЕ МЕХАНИЗМОВ 
ДЕЙСТВЕННОЙ ЗАЩИТЫ ПРАВ 
СОБСТВЕННОСТИ ВСЕХ 
УЧАСТНИКОВ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЙ 
ЖИЗНИ, ЧТО ПРЕДПОЛАГАЕТ  
* разработку механизмов реализации 
контрактных прав, прав собственников 
и акционеров, установление 
прозрачности деятельности 
предприятий для акционеров; 
* декриминализацию процедуры 
банкротств путем устранения 
многочисленных лазеек, имеющихся в 
Законе о банкротстве, обеспечение 
государственного контроля за 
соблюдением «правил игры» при 
проведении банкротств, усиление 
контролирующей роли федеральных 
органов исполнительной власти, 
установление реальной 
ответственности временного 
управляющего за исполнение закона, 
стимулирование государством 
создания и развития крупных 
специализированных компаний, 
обладающих достаточными 
интеллектуальными, административно-
организационными, а возможно, и 
финансовыми ресурсами для того, 
чтобы осуществлять ответственное 
внешнее управление предприятиями-
банкротами; 
* обеспечение процесса смены 
собственника в конфликтных 
ситуациях в рамках гласных, 
прозрачных и при этом достаточно 
оперативных судебных процедур.  
* предприятие должно выставлять на 
торги целиком, чтобы исключить 
возможность высасывания из него 
наиболее ликвидных ресурсов. 
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4) РАЗРАБОТКА МЕХАНИЗМОВ 
СОБЛЮДЕНИЯ КОНТРАКТОВ  
В интересах решения этой задачи 
требуется проведение всесторонней 
судебной реформы, направленной на 
достижение следующих основных целей: 
* независимость органов судебной 
власти от власти исполнительной, в 
том числе – в нынешней российской 
системе власти – и от президента как 
фактического главы исполнительной 
власти; 
* создание механизмов исполнения 
судебных решений и независимой 
системы контроля их качества; 
* реализация программ защиты судей, 
потерпевших и свидетелей. 
Необходимо решение проблемы 
финансирования деятельности судов. 
Нищета последних делает их зависимыми 
практически от любого источника 
финансирования, который может носить в 
том числе и криминальный характер. 
Слабость суда не просто лишает 
общество и государство инструментария 
борьбы с преступностью и коррупцией, 
но и делает невозможными судебное, т.е. 
легальное, решение споров, вынуждая 
дополнять его неформальными и, как 
правило, незаконными действиями. А это 
– классическая услуга, оказываемая 
организованной преступностью при 
помощи неразрывно связанной с нею 
коррупции. 
5) ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЕ ЧЕТКОСТИ И 
ОДНОЗНАЧНОСТИ ЗАКОНОВ 
В этих целях сегодня необходимо 
ликвидировать большое число законов 
непрямого действия, оставляющих 
простор для чиновничьего произвола, 
коррупции, нарушения законодательства 
(наиболее яркий пример – Таможенный 
кодекс). Целесообразно проведение всех 
проектов законов, постановлений и 
инструкций через специальную 
экспертизу, отсекающую положения, 
создающие предпосылки для 
криминализации экономических 
процессов и развития коррупции.  
Необходим тщательный анализ 
законодательных актов, регулирующих 
особо криминализированные сферы 
экономики, скорейшая ликвидация 
имеющихся в нем многочисленных 
«дыр». Так, очевидно, что Уголовный 
кодекс должен включать нормы 
ответственности высших должностных 
лиц за сам факт нарушения закона при 
распоряжении государственной 
собственностью, бюджетными 
средствами, незаконное предоставление 
налоговых, таможенных или иных льгот, 
если этим нанесен ущерб государству и 
обществу. Наличие же личной 
заинтересованности должно 
рассматриваться не как необходимое 
условие для привлечения к 
ответственности, а лишь как 
дополнительное отягчающее 
преступление обстоятельство. 
6) ФОРМИРОВАНИЕ 
ВЫСОКОКАЧЕСТВЕННОГО 
КАДРОВОГО И ТЕХНИЧЕСКОГО 
СОСТАВА КОНТРОЛЬНЫХ СЛУЖБ 
Ввиду резкого изменения экономических 
реалий, появления принципиально новых 
явлений и феноменов в экономике задача 
контроля за деятельностью субъектов 
хозяйствования существенно 
осложнилась. Во избежание ситуации, 
когда чем легче в каком-то секторе 
экономики осуществлять измерения и 
контроль, тем с большей вероятностью 
именно на нем будет сконцентрировано 
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внимание контрольных служб 
государства и, следовательно, наиболее 
важные сферы экономики (финансово-
кредитная сфера, внешнеэкономические 
связи и т.д.) оказываются наименее 
контролируемыми со стороны 
российского государства, требуется:  
* обеспечение подготовки 
принципиально новых 
высококвалифицированных кадров для 
контрольных служб;  
* установление  прямой зависимости 
между финансированием деятельности 
контрольных служб и их вкладом в 
общий доход государственного 
бюджета; 
* внедрение системы непосредственного 
экономического стимулирования 
работников контрольных служб в 
зависимости от величин выявленных 
ими нарушений (т.е. объема санкций, 
предъявляемых нарушителю, и 
средств, получаемых от него в доходы 
государства). 
7) ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЕ РЕАЛЬНОГО 
РАВЕНСТВА ВСЕХ ГРАЖДАН ПЕРЕД 
ЗАКОНОМ 
* Ни одно должностное лицо и ни один 
государственный орган не должны 
иметь права принятия решений, 
подрывающих равноправие граждан. 
Принятие должностными лицами 
органов государственной власти 
подобных незаконных решений, 
нарушающих конституционные основы 
демократического государства, должно 
рассматриваться как тяжкое 
государственное преступление. 
* Узаконенный гипертрофированный 
иммунитет от правосудия 
представителей законодательной, 
судебной власти должен быть 
существенно ограничен, приведен в 
соответствие с общепризнанными в 
мире нормами, а фактические 
возможности чиновников уклоняться 
от ответственности за нарушение 
законов – решительно устранены.  
* В современных условиях равенство 
всех граждан перед законом можно 
обеспечить лишь на путях 
решительной борьбы с коррупцией. 
Криминализация экономики и 
коррумпированность государственного 
сектора – это две стороны медали. Для 
того, чтобы высшая государственная 
власть смогла начать борьбу с 
коррупцией, чтобы в эту борьбу начало 
верить общество, следует срочно 
отстранить от высшей власти лиц и 
организации, ассоциируемые с 
коррупцией, особенно на высшем 
уровне. Необходимо восстановление 
норм деловой этики, без чего никакое 
повышение уровня материального 
обеспечения и социальной 
защищенности работников госаппарата 
не даст желаемых результатов. 
* Следует принять цивилизованный 
закон о лоббировании, создающий 
публичный, легальный механизм 
согласования интересов промышленно-
предпринимательского сообщества и 
органов государственной власти; в 
частности, представляется разумных 
принять правило, по которому позиция 
отраслевых ассоциаций 
предпринимателей по каждому 
вопросу, который, по их мнению, 
затрагивает их деятельность, должна 
быть доведена до сведения депутатов, 
принимающих закон, или 
руководителя, принимающего тот или 
иной нормативный акт. Это мнение 
может быть учтено или отвергнуто без 
обсуждения с высказавшими его, но 
субъекты экономики должны иметь 
право на доведение своего мнения до 
государства. 
 
* * * * * 
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BUSINESS – STATE RELATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA 
IN CONCERN TO CORRUPTION PHENOMENON 
Oleg V. Pachenkov* 
INTRODUCTION 
In my paper I am going to present 
some preliminary results of the research 
project “Prospects for fighting corruption 
in post socialist countries: cases of Russia 
and Hungary”.1 In according to Corrup-
tion Perception Index (CPI) by Transpar-
ency International Russia is ranked now 
86th among 100 countries. In according 
to INDEM foundation – Russian NGO 
doing economical, political and sociologi-
cal researches on the corruption issue, 
nowadays about 34 billions USD are 
spent by Russian people for bribes. In 
my opinion these two numbers show that 
corruption is a significant problem for 
contemporary Russian society. 
However, I believe that the whole 
phenomenon of corruption could hardly 
become a subject for empirical sociologi-
cal research. That is why we choose one 
segment and concentrated on the busi-
ness – state relationships. However even 
this topic is still too wide and complex 
and we were forced to focus on more 
precise and concrete fragment of state-
                                          
 
1 The project was supported by USAID and IRIS 
foundation in the framework of the Think Tank 
partnership program. Our main partner was 
Hungarian Think Tank “Foundation for Market 
Economy” and American University (TRACCC, 
Washington D.C.). See final report at: 
www.indepsocres.spb.ru. 
business relationships. Recent studies 
identify Russia's regional and municipal 
levels as the most corrupt levels of au-
thority. Data on “corruption flows” in 
Russia's bureaucratic market gathered by 
the INDEM foundation, that the munici-
pal level of authority is the most corrupt 
(75% of corruption market), the regional 
level comes in second (20%) and the 
federal level third (5%)2 (Satarov, 2002). 
Because of this, we considered it essen-
tial to focus our research on state – 
business corruption at the municipal level 
(the case of St Petersburg), which cur-
rently poses such an impediment to 
business development. And the study 
considered small and medium-sized busi-
ness as the most sensitive and least pro-
tected business sector facing corruption.  
In order to determine the social 
mechanisms and hidden conditions of 
corruption, we focused our empirical 
research on actual business behaviour 
and examined how business and munici-
pal authorities interact in practice. The 
research included quantitative and quali-
tative analysis of the phenomenon of 
business corruption in the sphere of 
small and medium-sized business. The 
main purposes of the study we formu-
lated as follows: 
* to identify key problems facing small 
business that provide a breeding 
ground for corruption; 
* to gauge the extent to which the cor-
rupt practices of business are adaptive 
                                          
2 These figures refer to low-level business cor-
ruption. 
* Center for Independent Social Research 
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responses to the legislative, economic 
and social environment;  
* to evaluate the willingness and readi-
ness of business people to act against 
corruption. 
Although our study was focused on 
the St Petersburg municipality alone, the 
outcomes received in the course of the 
study are not specific for St Petersburg 
and could be reasonably extended to the 
whole situation in small and medium-
sized business in Russia. The broader 
generalizations can be rather made on 
the basis of the qualitative data based on 
30 interviews with representatives of 
small and medium-sized (SMEs) enter-
prises in St Petersburg.1 It reveals the 
nature of corrupt relationships, particu-
larities of informal interactions between 
business and the state in small and me-
dium-sized business.  
Problem areas and topics (formulated 
by the informants in interview) 
Problems, giving birth to corruption 
practices  
On the basis of the analysis of our in-
terviews we pointed out the problematic 
areas as follow: 
1) Imperfection of the bureaucratic 
system: its inefficiency, inflexibility, 
slowness, etc. 
Our informants stressed that one of the 
reasons for corruption is wrong system, 
all decisions need ages to be made; one 
has to spend so much efforts and time 
to solve this or that small bureaucratic 
problem – so he or she has no time for 
proper work! Moreover, these proce-
                                          
1 Several kinds of business is represented in our 
data basis: trading (including foods) – 11; pro-
duction (including construction) – 5; services 
(including cafes, securities (stocks, etc.), business 
and law consulting, etc.) – 14; To find infor-
mants we used method of “snow-ball” – found 
them mostly through personal networks; first of 
all – because the topic of the research was too 
sensitive and personal trust was an important 
part of communication, otherwise we would get 
a lot of general words and speculations.  
dures look like artificially overcompli-
cated by officials. Many informants refer 
to Western experience where one need 
to send one letter to officials to notify 
them she/she is going to start business – 
that is it, on comparison to kilos of pa-
pers, hundreds of stamps, months of 
time one need to spend to start business 
legally in contemporary Russia. As a re-
sult, people say, it is much easier to re-
fuse the idea to run business at all than 
to start it! Or you need to employ illegal 
methods, shadow economy tools to stipu-
late all the procedures at the very be-
ginning of your business already: “In the 
middle of the summer, in the middle of 
our process they dismissed local officials. 
And put new ones. And correspondingly 
– now a comma should be not there, all 
the documents need to be remade, some-
thing needs to be added, something to 
be removed. Nothing depends on me! 
And in the end again they do not allow 
to open it (enterprise)” 
2) Old fashioned laws and regulations: 
lack of logic in bureaucratic rules 
and regulations, lack of correspon-
dence of these rules to the context 
of real life. 
Our informants mention many times that 
some contemporary rules are totally out 
of logic and reality! It is true especially 
in case of department’s instructions (not 
laws) – these of sanitary and fire protec-
tions services, for instance. Some of these 
instructions are dated by 1960-70s, some 
are even by 1930s! Thus they are totally 
out of reality! It makes impossible to fol-
low them in real practices. Officials, who 
are responsible for these rules and come 
to enterprises to control them, know 
about this impossibility to follow the 
rules. So the only way to handle out this 
problematic situation is to bribe officials, 
to let them “shut their eyes” to the vio-
lations of stupid but existing rules: “We 
belong to public catering, but we don’t 
cook anything ourselves. They insist on 
setting three new sinks, for example. We 
don’t need them! We don’t cook any-
thing! But if they want, they can shut us 
  
33
down because of this. And these norms, 
these rules, they have not been changed 
practically from 1974. 1974 and 2004!?”  
3) Meaningly kept gap in laws and 
rules: laws and regulations are de-
signed in a way they could not be 
followed by people. 
This is quite popular sentence: “you can 
not conform all rules, it is just impossi-
ble – then you have to close your enter-
prise!” (impossibility to pay all taxes is a 
variety of this kind of claims). Business-
men cannot understand who needs all 
these troubles. The only explanation is: 
bureaucrats need it to initiate corruption 
in form of bribing for pushing, acceler-
ating procedures. People believe this is a 
kind of “meaningly kept gap in laws” 
done and kept by officials to have a 
chance to catch and punish (to fine usu-
ally) any businessman – because there is 
always a rule you do not conform for 
some reasons; at the same time this is a 
way for officials to find violations and to 
initiate corruption as a way for busi-
nessmen to avoid official punishment (the 
size of bribes is usually smaller then the 
size of official fine): “In such a situation, 
in the real state of thing, constantly 
whatever you are doing you are always 
violating the law. And you always feel 
yourself a criminal and in fact, you are 
forced to pay off”. 
There are several consequences from 
this situation – for the attitudes of busi-
nessmen towards the officials and bu-
reaucratic structures, and consequently – 
for the state-business relationship:  
Distrust attitude: all our informants 
mentioned that they do not believe in 
“fair (honest) bureaucrat”.  
Everyone is sure that all officials take 
bribes – bigger or smaller, they all are 
corrupted and are kind of people who 
“won’t lift a finger” without money. It 
causes to certain attitudes and activities 
of people, including businessmen. It 
means that they all a priori are ready to 
give bribes to officials; many businessmen 
do not even try to find legal and official 
ways of solutions of this or that problem 
– they start straight away with looking 
for access to corrupted officials to give 
them money to solve their problems in 
this way – “fast and easy” (in compari-
son to official way): “In reality, when 
instance comes to business, and find 
problems, you will understand that they 
have come here not to shut you down 
as soon as possible and, etc. No, they 
have come here in order to get some 
money from you”. 
Attitude for a distance: businessmen 
prefer to keep a great distance between 
themselves and state. 
Those who succeed to keep distance 
consider themselves to be lucky. They do 
want to have as less as possible in 
common with the state: “Knowing that 
the state is a vampire, we have brought 
to minimum our contacts to the state”. 
Functional approach: businessmen treat 
corruption as natural, integral part of 
interaction with the state and power 
representatives. 
Businessmen use the logic and rhetoric 
of “transaction costs” toward bribes and 
other forms of corruption: corruption is 
interpreted in this case in economic 
terms, without any emotions involved. 
We call it “functional approach”: “I need 
to get something. If I can get this, say, 
by bribing an official – well, there is 
nothing else to do, it is an unavoidable 
evil, if I want to get this desired object”. 
However simultaneously with the func-
tional approach another attitude takes 
place as well. We call it: 
Emotional disgust: though many busi-
nessmen treat corruption as transactional 
costs, there are many of them who hates 
all this corruption procedures, first of all 
– because of emotional feelings – people 
hate to feel humiliation and feebleness, 
independence – these terms our infor-
mants used to describe their feelings in 
situation of interaction with corrupted 
officials, in situations of giving bribes, 
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etc.: “I want to say that every official 
depending on his upbringing, his intellect 
and I don’t know what else to a bigger 
or minor degree but he would necessar-
ily smear you on the table. If he is a 
cad, then he will be actively doing this. 
If he is a well-brought-up, then he will 
be doing this by his indifference. None 
of them takes care!” 
The last but not least consequence is 
the intermediaries boom. On this issue I 
would like to concentrate.  
Intermediaries’ boom as a new feature 
of the corruption market 
Interviews with businessmen have explic-
itly demonstrated the emergence of a 
wide-scale market for informal and semi-
formal services mediating relations be-
tween business and the authorities. In 
recent years, there has been a growth of 
legalized and formalized firms-mediators 
selling bureaucratic services. We have 
called this phenomenon an intermediaries’ 
boom.  
We realized that the growth of 
intermediaries is predetermined by the 
fact that these services are good for 
businessmen. They prefer to deal with 
intermediates instead of dealing directly 
with officials because it is simpler: 
intermediates know all the details and 
hidden dangers of this process. It is 
faster and anyway it saves time and 
therefore – money. It makes possible to 
avoid emotional strain, which is usually 
a painful part of the interpersonal 
communication between businessmen and 
officials; when a businessperson goes to 
an intermediary, the situation is different 
– it takes the shape of formal service 
and businesspeople feel like a customer 
in that case. Finally, sometimes 
intermediaries provide the only possible 
way to get access to this or that 
bureaucrat: “So, if you come in just like 
that from the street – you will be kicked 
out”. Although at first glance, the situation 
with intermediaries looks reasonable and 
very similar to the situation in the West, 
in Russia these services seem to function 
as a screen, being in fact a hidden form 
of rewarding officials for accelerating 
bureaucratic procedures for additional 
payment. Of course, these are hypotheti-
cal assumptions that need to be specially 
investigated in further studies; however 
the interviews provide some evidence for 
this already now.  
As a matter of fact, intermediaries 
combine in their activities explicit func-
tions and hidden or shadow functions. 
The main resource for accomplishing 
these functions is their access to a 
bureaucratic structure (or a bureaucrat) 
that provides the possibility for obtaining 
a necessary bureaucratic service. There 
are several evidences, which allow our 
informants to interpret intermediaries as 
involved in corruption relationships:  
(1) It is considered that the very fact of 
existence of such intermediates im-
plies illegality already: people believe 
that many of these intermediate 
firms are artificially created by offi-
cials themselves – in order to em-
ploy their friends, relatives and other 
loyal people who will take money 
from clients for intermediating ser-
vices and then share this money with 
officials for who they work. So in 
this case such intermediates are arti-
ficial obstacles, barriers created by 
officials to stop and collect money 
for themselves and people who are 
loyal to them. This is the case of is-
suing licenses, for instance: “There 
are about a dozen people involved, 
you know, like relatives, friends, 
who, bring him [the official] about 
half [of the money]. But they deal 
with this. If they bring this paper – 
it will be accepted [by the officials], 
if not [them] – well, it won’t. It’s 
amazing! ”  
(2) Quite often officials mobilize the 
power resource which turns out into 
the monopoly right for the interme-
diaries: our informants mentioned 
situations when officials force them 
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to deal with certain commercial firm 
to buy certain products of services 
which are needed for the enterprise 
to fit the official’s requirements. Of 
course in these firms all products 
and services are much more expen-
sive than in ordinary firm, but offi-
cials refuse to recognize certificates, 
products and services of any other 
firms. It looks like mediated extor-
tion or blackmail. Businessmen be-
lieve that those intermediate firms 
are created by official departments 
or anyway share money with the 
bureaucrats. So officials use their 
power resource to force businessmen 
to buy goods and services from cer-
tain firms which are confidants of 
the authorities: “Firemen – they are 
just extortionists, in a direct sense. 
There are fire extinguishers, hanging 
on the wall. Nevertheless, we were 
forced to buy another one. And you 
should buy an extinguisher in the 
specialized shop which is situated at 
the fire unit”; 
(3) Another explanation of the existence 
of intermediates is their involvement 
into illegal corruptive practices. Our 
informants believe that bureaucrats 
create these firms because they do 
not want to run risk and take 
bribes from people “from the out-
side”. They prefer to take money 
from those who they know, which 
they trust: “First of all, you won’t 
get to authorities being just a person 
from the street. Nobody will let you 
in – neither in Smolnyi, nor in 
Voznesenskogo street,1 where some 
committees are sitting. You will not 
be issued a pass, and that’s it, you 
are out. In order to get there, you 
need to have a possibility to get 
there…”;  
So we can see the contradiction here: 
on the one hand, businessmen often pre-
                                          
1 Locations of the offices of the Municipal Au-
thorities in St Petersburg. 
fer to deal with them instead of direct 
deals with bureaucrats, but, on the other 
hand, they blame intermediaries for cor-
ruption involvement and extortion. What 
conclusions might be drawn from this 
contradiction? One possible answer is: 
there are different intermediaries, work-
ing in different ways, realizing different 
functions, etc. We assume that the dis-
tinguishing of intermediaries for two 
types must be drawn as follow: 
* “pure extortionists”: here we unite 
intermediaries who are created on an 
“empty place”, usually – by corruptive 
bureaucrats themselves or sometimes 
are linked to the latter (usually – 
share with them money); this second 
type of intermediaries is absolutely ar-
tificial, needless, useless and harmful; 
their services are not rooted in any 
demands of the market relations – 
they are imposed to businessmen by 
corruptive officials; these services com-
plicate simple procedure and allow 
bureaucrats to extort money for ser-
vices they are supposed to provide for 
free;  
* commercial type or “VIP service”: by 
this type we unite intermediaries, 
which provide practically and com-
mercially rooted “chargeable services”. 
Here we deal with the ordinary situa-
tion when one pays for faster and 
simpler procedure which he or she 
might get for free but it takes time; 
so one could prefer to save time and 
spend extra money; in fact business-
men combine both strategies – they 
deal directly with bureaucrats when 
there is no hurry and/or they have 
no extra money to spend; but they 
deal with intermediaries when time is 
pressing and there are extra money.  
These latter types of intermediaries 
are rather “normal” from the functional 
point of view. The only feature making 
this type of intermediaries a part of cor-
ruption relations is the very fact that 
money paid by businessmen do not go to 
the budget but settle in the official’s 
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pockets. Moreover, there is a strong 
need for this kind of intermediaries be-
cause the system of regulations and their 
implementation is very bad in Russian 
society; and even in case laws and regu-
lations are good – the infrastructure is 
old fashioned, slow, inefficient. This is a 
challenge of a market system to a 
clumsy bureaucratic system, or as Rus-
sian economic sociologist Vadim Radaev 
says this is a case of an “institutional 
compromise” when one kind of institutes 
do not fit the other type (for instance, 
economic institutes do not fit the bu-
reaucratic ones) and compromise is 
needed. In case the market system wins 
and bureaucratic institutions change then 
there will be no demand for corruption 
and we will get ordinary institute of in-
termediaries of western type when all the 
payments will be formalized, i.e. made 
legally and become taxable. If inert bu-
reaucratic system will not change – then 
corruptive component will remain in this 
kind of intermediating services, although 
services are functionally reasonable.  
Perspectives for the further investiga-
tions (instead of conclusion) 
Unfortunately interviews showed quite 
unpromising results in the regard of 
fighting corruption activities. Almost all 
of our informants claimed they would 
like to have an association which would 
protect rights of SMEs against corrupted 
officials, because they do not trust any 
other structures/institutions in this con-
cern; however no one ever dealt with 
any business-association in order to solve 
the corruption problem and no one be-
lieves these associations could be created 
by SME businessmen and could be effi-
cient in fighting against corruption: 
“Well, how to unite? You think I have 
nothing else to do? And the same is the 
rest. When? And who we will be uniting 
with? No. First of all, everyone has a 
thousand of things to do, and problems 
are very different. Someone opened long 
time ago, someone recently, someone is 
thinking how to change a Mercedes to 
Rolls Royce, someone is thinking how to 
make both ends meet. And everybody is 
put in the same conditions, that all are 
entrepreneurs”; 
or: 
“I am more than certain that entrepre-
neurs of course can gather, sit in a 
room together, smoke, drink coffee and 
talk that that’s it, we are fighting. But 
when each of us personally will be ad-
dressed by some bodies, he will be solv-
ing this problem on his own, because 
everyone understands that if he does not 
give a bribe by some principal motives, 
he will loose more. Entrepreneurs are 
people who count money”. 
As a result civic associations, self-
initiated associations of SMEs either do 
not exist or work for different aims. For 
now our hypothesis in this concern looks 
as follows: very few NGOs have ap-
peared because there has been a huge 
boom in intermediary firms instead. 
Businessmen prefer to solve their prob-
lems not through establishing business 
associations but through addressing in-
termediary firms, which are involved in 
corruption activities. For businessmen 
who seek to achieve their goals with 
minimal costs this way occurs to be the 
optimal solution whereas from the posi-
tion of the society and corruption pre-
vention this is a dead end, which repro-
duces corruption relations and promotes 
further embededdness of corruption 
mechanisms in the society. The most im-
portant consequence of the intermediary 
firms boom is that they reduce the de-
mand among businessmen for fighting 
corruption and therefore reduce their 
support for business associations and 
NGOs: intermediaries attract business re-
sources (money, time and force) which 
could be invested into the development 
of anticorruption NGOs activities.  
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NATURE OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT                     
IN HUNGARY* 
T. Benedek – M. M. Dezsériné – M. Knáb –  
A. Krassó – A. R. Trönnberg 
Research workers of the Foundation of 
Market Economy were surveying the na-
ture of corruption by reviewing the de-
velopment path of public procurement 
procedure in Hungary. Purpose of the 
Hungarian research was to review the 
different facts and opinions in connection 
of setting a limit to reducing corruption 
in the public procurement procedure and 
also to value the chance of developing 
the anti-corruption practice in it. 
It could be stated on the basis of 
opinions collected via in-depth interviews 
at more than 50 buyers and seller 
institutions (ministries, local governments) 
and enterprises that both the buyers 
(proposal requesters) and sellers (pro-
posal givers) are interested in decreasing 
the danger of corruption, increasing 
transparency, equal chances and also 
improving efficiency of operation level in 
course of the public procurement proce-
dure. The amendment of the Act on 
Public Procurement (PPA) on the agenda 
leads to a progress in the process, which 
– according to the parties’ opinion – 
changes advantageously the sphere of 
public procurement regulatory enact-
ments. We are expecting that corruption 
danger could be decreased by monitor-
ing the transparency and efficiency of 
the public procurement procedure and 
permanent strengthening of formal con-
tacts. 
Our conclusions, suggestions can be 
grouped into four topics: 
* prospects of closing the front doors of 
corruption, 
* endeavours to eliminate the back 
doors of corruption, 
* relations between the efficiency level of 
public procurement and the dangers 
of corruption, and 
* fragile balance in terminology and in-
terpretations. 
1) PROSPECTS OF CLOSING THE 
FRONT DOORS OF CORRUPTION 
Openness in public procurement is 
clearly ensured if procurements made by 
institutions are carried out in accordance 
with the order of public procurement 
procedures as required by law. If pro-
curements are removed from under the 
force of the PPA, the opportunity consid-
ered by the public as a „corruption 
front door” opens up. We will now list 
the factors that may influence the 
spreading of procurements conducted as 
part of public procurement procedures 
at a slower pace and in a more contra-
dictory manner than desirable: 
* This study was developed in the frame of the 
project titled „Fighting corruption in post-socialist 
countries: cases of Russia and Hungary” spon-
sored by USAID, IRIS, KPMG Consulting Barents 
Group with participation of the following NGOs: 
Foundation for Market Economy (Budapest), Cen-
ter for Independent Social Research (St Peters-
burg) and American University Transnational 
Crime and Corruption Center (Washington). 
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* Preparedness of those applying the 
law, staff shortage, problems pertain-
ing to interpretation and approach. 
* Contradictions of other provisions per-
taining to the regulations on budget 
financing, special issues related to 
practical solutions. 
* Successful assertion of group interests 
in excluding the public and regarding 
transparency. 
Further to the practice of the last 
three years and the findings of the in-
depth interviews, it can be ascertained 
that we have found examples of all the 
above-mentioned factors pertaining to the 
exclusion of procurements financed from 
public funds from the scope of the Act 
on Public Procurement.  
In summary, it can be ascertained 
that, in a successful assertion of group 
interests to evade the rules of public 
procurement, the following also play a 
fundamental role:  
* Legislation does not possess an appro-
priate independence (possibly it is 
rather filled with politics). 
* The media, instead of revealing facts 
in a well-founded manner, opts for 
the easier way and – affecting emo-
tions, – supports a politics of scan-
dals.  
* Public morals/public culture do not 
carry an anti-corruption conduct in a 
wide, society-level sense.  
Our former findings, in our world 
progressing on the road towards global-
isation, are valid also beyond country 
boundaries. 
2) ENDEAVOURS TO ELIMINATE THE 
BACK DOORS OF CORRUPTION 
The transparency and clarity of public 
procurements can only be ensured by 
guarantees of openness. In our survey, 
we examined corruption risks occurring 
during the preparation of bids or while 
issuing invitations for bids and also dur-
ing the decision-making process.   
It is a general opinion that bids are 
not announced on the basis of proper 
expertise and, as a result, are not an-
nounced precisely. Institutions inviting 
tenders are sometimes unable to deter-
mine their needs precisely in few fields 
(i.e. IT). As a consequence, bidders will 
become exposed.  
Another extreme is the unreasonably 
strict formal requirements in tenders. It 
is often problem, that approximately 20-
40 percent of all the efforts made in 
compiling a tender will be dedicated to 
the substantial part, whereas 60-80 per-
cent on meeting formal requirements. 
Bidders also complained that opportuni-
ties for completing omissions are also not 
regulated in a uniform manner and that 
exclusions are often made on such 
grounds. Based on the wishes of many, 
granting the option to submit missing 
documentation in the course of public 
procurement procedures should also be 
harmonised! The reason we think this is 
a well founded request is because today, 
during the preparation phase of public 
procurement tenders – for example in 
research – there seem to be way too 
much fuss about formal errors. 
The proposed amendment of the PPA 
may present a significant step forward 
in handling unfounded commitments. 
Considering competition in the market of 
public procurements, at times bidders 
undertake commitments that interfere 
with fair competition, violate generally 
accepted professional practices, rules of 
ethics (unfounded content elements of the 
bid such as prices too low or, in a 
manner fit for humour magazines, a 
warranty for 700 years) to ensure that 
the entity inviting tenders awards these 
sections the maximum number of scores. 
The proposed amendment of the PPA 
intends to handle this issue by providing 
that institutions inviting tenders must as-
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certain the splidity and feasibility of such 
content elements of tenders that look un-
real and impossible to fulfil. Inappropri-
ate explanation may also result in exclu-
sion.  
However, what do we consider ap-
propriate explanation? If executing the 
above-mentioned public procurement at 
an unreal price may, as a reference, 
generate significant assignments for the 
bidder at a later date, a low price as a 
good investment may produce multiple 
returns. Thus, from the bidder’s point of 
view, this is a great deal that should not 
be disapproved of. 
Who should the law protect; can it be 
regulated at all? Is there a need for 
regulation? The draft bill only mentions 
requests for explanations but does not 
deal with the future course thereof, as 
to when, under what circumstances can 
an explanation be accepted? 
Another question is whether or not 
the contractor will be actually motivated 
if the price is unusually low? Although, 
at this point, it was added that the 
above can be prevented by concluding a 
good contract and by setting forth ap-
propriate liquidated damages and penal-
ties, however, a great deal of caution is 
till required to handle this question. Ad-
dressing problems possibly arising will be 
time-consuming and complex even in 
case of a good contract.  
It would be important to elaborate a 
more differentiated system of evaluation 
criteria (with weightings) used for the 
evaluation of the bids. In order to 
achieve this, the person(s) responsible for 
public procurements within the organisa-
tion should agree with the expert who is 
capable to express the definition of key 
substantial elements in a mathematical 
approach. Bidders wanting to prepare a 
proper tender should know the exact 
needs of inviters, who should meanwhile 
also look after all the available solutions 
on the market. This presumes the profes-
sional relation between inviters and bid-
ders. 
In summary, it can be established that 
compliance with the Act in itself will not 
eliminate corruption. Intentions relating 
to corruption will either diminish or 
there will be no reason for corruption if 
an appropriate market balance exists in 
one form or another. Thus, the question 
is whether or not those carrying out 
procurement activities possess an appro-
priate knowledge of the market and for 
what purpose and how reasonably public 
funds are used as the PPA only includes 
provisions on how to use such public 
funds. 
It was a common view of both those 
inviting and submitting bids that an op-
portunity for corruption only occurs 
when determining the professional crite-
ria and upon possible leakage of infor-
mation. In all other occurrences, corrup-
tion will result in a violation of the law, 
which, in most cases, will become known 
almost immediately. Therefore, the opin-
ion is that the call for bids, with special 
emphasis on its professional section, must 
be extremely specific and clear as re-
gards wording. 
Unfortunately we think that the condi-
tions capable of ensuring a meaningful 
substantive control and monitoring of 
goods/services/investments created as a 
result of the public procurement process 
are not yet available. These conditions 
partly lack the financial background and 
partly miss electronic support.  
According to certain extreme opinions, 
the institution of monitoring is practically 
unknown in Hungary. Indeed, it would 
be necessary to prepare an actual analy-
sis instead of formal reports upon the 
completion of some large scale assistance 
projects. It would be worth considering 
that, similarly to the EU practice, a pre-
defined percentage of assistances should 
be allocated for that purpose. 
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3) RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 
EFFICIENCY LEVEL OF 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND 
THE DANGERS OF COR-
RUPTION 
The inflexibility of the public procure-
ment procedure is causing problems 
mainly for investments whose market is 
changing rapidly, and where advantages 
of innovative breakthroughs and actions 
should be used. It is difficult to apply 
the PPA currently in force in these areas 
and the success of the procedure is 
questionable. Procurements realised 
through such procedures will not yield 
the best, up-to-dare and cheap offers as 
such process is time consuming and the 
requirements of the tender rapidly be-
come obsolete. 
The scope of centrally procured prod-
ucts is also difficult to handle from the 
point of view of flexibility and adjust-
ment to existing infrastructure. Although 
the persons interviewed basically judged 
the majority of centrally procured prod-
ucts as adequate, yet, the scope of such 
products is contested mainly in the case 
of healthcare and partly in the case of 
IT products, due to the following rea-
sons: 
(1) Due to the one-year or longer 
framework agreements for central-
ised public procurements, the proc-
ess of changing products and prices 
is inflexible – especially in dynami-
cally growing areas such as IT 
(portable memory, for example, was 
not yet available a year ago and 
therefore does not feature among 
centrally procured products, al-
though it should be listed among 
them).  
(2) The issue of compatibility is a basic 
criteria both in the area of IT and 
health care, since recently procured 
equipment, appliances or accessories 
must be compatible with the other 
systems, equipment or appliances 
used by the company or the health-
care institution.  
(3) Experience shows that the same 
product may not be ordered in 
large quantity for each department 
of each hospital because the institu-
tions and the doctors want to stick 
to the equipment they used and 
tested in the past. Further, new pro-
curements must also be adjusted to 
circumstances, and to the usual 
processes applied. 
Many believe that the public procure-
ment procedure “is over complicated”. 
By this, they mean that a lot more re-
cords and various application forms 
must be obtained and kept, which, on 
occasion, do not facilitate the procure-
ment activity or are related to it only 
remotely. They have also indicated as a 
problem that the authorities issuing cer-
tain certificates are not always prepared 
to enforce the law.  
The degree of savings that may be 
achieved through public procurement is 
a rather controversial issue. No accurate 
report has ever been produced in that 
respect, neither by the EU nor by Hun-
gary; although some estimations are pub-
lished form time to time. However, the 
position can be maintained according to 
which public procurement regulation 
presumes the efficacy thereof, i.e. the 
savings that can be realised through its 
application are higher than the costs as-
sociated with the implementation of the 
formal procedures. 
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4) FRAGILE BALANCE IN 
TERMINOLOGY AND 
INTERPRETATIONS 
It can be regarded as a general opinion, 
that the relevant regulations and the ex-
pected modifications thereof are adequate 
in terms of mitigating the risk of cor-
ruption to a significant extent. Yet, it is 
impossible to fully eliminate abuses only 
through administrative measures. A 
change in attitude and a different ap-
proach is required to prevent corruption. 
Intertwining of interests may not be ex-
cluded nor can the maintenance of in-
formation contacts or the leaking of in-
formation during the preparations phase 
be done away with. 
The Act on lobbying is also missing, 
which, if well formulated, could be a 
supporting force in that matter and the 
public opinion would not confuse lobby-
ing with corruption. In the opinion of 
the experts on the subject, unfortunately 
today it is still difficult to differentiate 
lobbying from corruption not only in 
Hungary but also in the entire post so-
cialist region. Many explain this phe-
nomenon by the fact that politics are 
present throughout the preparation and 
implementation of tenders connected to 
the implementation of large scale projects 
– exerting significant influence on inter-
national relations and the national econ-
omy – and are capable of pursuing their 
‘expectations’.  
It would be necessary to practically 
define the profile of lobbying and regu-
late its functioning. Academic experts 
have a hard time providing a scientific 
explanation for lobbying; governance 
basing on a practical approach would be 
needed. 
At the same time, another question 
arises: should we treat a well functioning 
partner relationship as corruption, a 
partner relationship which is character-
ised by continuous communication in or-
der to best meet the needs of the client? 
Should we suspect corruption when the 
client is invited to a professional event, 
or when the known supplier consults the 
client on the occasion of a tender? 
It is a serious concern of many par-
ties interviewed, that the requirements 
pertaining to public procurement proce-
dures should be fully enforced from one 
day to the next which questions the fu-
ture of any previous professional co-
operation. We are talking about long-
term development co-operation agree-
ments as a result of which numerous 
products have been developed jointly and 
such joint efforts were settled later on 
by having the party as supplier. How-
ever, according to the new procedure, 
own experience may not be considered 
as reference, i.e. even though the client 
may know it full well that its partner 
company, with whom they have jointly 
developed or modified a product, could 
deliver the product in question at the 
highest quality possible; this may not be 
pursued as an advantage during the 
procurement procedure. This means that 
references of this kind may not consti-
tute an evaluation criteria. 
All of the institutions inviting tenders 
had a uniform opinion in that there is 
no need to further tighten the control of 
public procurement procedures. Instead, 
the fulfilment of the contracts following 
the procurement procedures should be 
monitored and deviations be sanctioned. 
 
* * * * * 
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PART THREE 
MACROECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND FOREIGN TRADE 
 
PERSPECTIVES FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN 
RUSSIA AND THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
András Köves* 
                                          
* Kopint–Datorg, Hungary 
This paper argues that Eastern enlarge-
ment of the European Union will not 
bring about any further significant 
changes in trade and economic coopera-
tion between Russia and the former so-
cialist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE). Most of the really impor-
tant changes related to the European in-
tegration and re-orientation have already 
occured in the period following 1989, 
and there is little left for the future. On 
the other hand, economic and political 
stabilization in the CEEs – of which full 
membership in the EU should be an im-
portant phase – may contribute to better 
conditions (than in the turbulent transi-
tion period) for the development of rela-
tions with Russia as well.  
De facto integration of CEEs in 
(Western) Europe started as early as 
1989-1990, concurrently to political 
change and economic transformation. Of 
all fields of integration, trade was the 
first to start. Trade re-orientation was 
an organic part of transformation (as a 
consequence of both the collapse of the 
CMEA and the rapid rise of trade with 
the West), and was an accomplished fact 
in most of the CEEs as soon as early 
90s. By the end of the millennium, the 
share of the 15 present member coun-
tries of the European Union in total 
trade of most of the CEEs reached the 
point of culmination (a share between 
two-thirds and three-quarters in exports; 
somewhat less in imports). This is a 
unique feature of Eastern enlargement 
(as compared to previous cases of 
enlargement): trade-creating and trade-
diverting effects of joining the European 
Union had emerged in their entirety be-
fore full membership of the new-comers 
was attained. It would make no sense 
(what is more, it would be even 
counter-productive) to aim at further 
increase of those shares.  
Parallel to the growing volumes of 
trade, and in accordance with the 
“Europe Agreements” concluded in the 
early 90s, trading systems and trade 
policies of now acceding countries have 
gradually approached those of the Union. 
Therefore, coming change from national 
trading systems, regulations and policies 
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of the CEEs, and also from nationally 
concluded trade agreements with third 
countries, to the acceptance of the com-
mon commercial policy of the Union will 
result in minor changes only, as far as 
conditions of trade, including those with 
third (non-member) countries are con-
cerned. Also, according to calculations, 
in case of Hungary for example, the 
change from national regime of Most-
Favoured-Nation treatment of Russia to 
the GFS treatment extended to Russia by 
the Union will not imply any significant 
alteration of conditions of bilateral com-
merce.  
From another perspective, the only 
beneficiaries of the fundamental changes 
of geographical (regional) composition of 
CEE’s trade following the political trans-
formations of more than a decade ago 
were developed countries, foremost the 
countries of Western Europe. To illus-
trate: Germany has not only become 
Hungary’s trading partner number one. 
Its present weight is outstanding in his-
torical perspective, too. Its share in 
Hungarian exports of recent years is 
higher than that of the Soviet Union dur-
ing the CMEA years. Taking account of 
overvaluation of the transferable rouble 
(the accounting currency of most of in-
tra-CMEA trade) before 1989, the num-
bers are especially striking.  
The rest were mostly losers. In physi-
cal terms, overall trade among the for-
mer socialist countries of Europe, taken 
together, does not seem to have reached 
the level of 1989 at the onset of this 
century. While decline of relations be-
tween Russia (and other CIS countries) 
on one hand, and the CEEs on the other, 
is the most dramatic development in for-
eign economic relations of post-socialist 
countries, the lack of dynamism and 
continuing relegation to the background 
of intra-CEE trade is a most surprising 
one.  
Mutual trade among CEEs has been 
of relatively limited significance for most 
of the last century. Before the war, this 
situation could be explained by un-
neighbourly relations among them, pro-
tectionism and strivings for mutual isola-
tion. In the socialist period, the reason 
was simple as well: CMEA cooperation 
had “radial” character. All the CEEs had 
robust relations with the Soviet Union 
(not only the political and military center 
of the grouping but a vast selling mar-
ket for CEEs’ manufacturing goods and 
– in some cases – food, and a source of 
imports of needed energy and raw ma-
terials), while trade among the smaller 
member-countries was neglected. In post-
socialist times, despite discontinuation of 
CMEA, and the establishment of the 
CEEs’ own – however, temporary – 
“small” integration within the framework 
of the CEFTA, integration in (Western) 
Europe in each of them had preference 
over integration with the other CEEs. 
From a somewhat different perspective: 
while integration of some or most CEEs 
in Europe and the global economy pro-
gressed quite well, European integration 
of the CEE region as a region was less 
dynamic. In Hungary, the share of CEEs 
both in exports and imports has been 
almost continuously subsiding for the 
whole period shown; today it is less than 
before the political changes. This state-
ment holds for each CEE one by one, for 
the group of former (smaller) CMEA 
members, and, finally, for CEEs in the 
broader sense. Some consolidation seems 
to be occuring in recent years.  
As a consequence of what has hap-
pened after 1989 in and around post-
socialist countries, the structure and 
character of their economic relations 
with each other changed immensely.  
Firstly, as a consequence of reorienta-
tion to the West of trade of all former 
CMEA member countries (and their suc-
cessors) following political changes, as 
well as the either attained or planned 
membership of the majority of former 
European CMEA members in the NATO 
and the European Union, the former 
CMEA lost all the characteristics of being 
an economic or trade bloc or group. As 
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shown by trade statistics, the center of 
gravitation for economies of all (or, at 
least, of the great majority of) sometime 
socialist countries lies outside the former 
bloc – in Western Europe.  
Secondly, contrary to the CMEA pe-
riod, and nothwithstanding the above-
mentioned and other factors, which act 
as a constraint to development of the 
economic relations among Central Euro-
pean countries, intra-CEE trade of the 
CEE countries is now larger than trade 
with Russia (or even trade with the 
whole CIS). This is especially the case 
with exports of CEEs.  
Thirdly, the most striking change fol-
lowing transformation is contraction of 
tzrade with Russia, first of all, exports 
to Russia. Trade between CEEs and Rus-
sia, while generally losing much of its 
former significance, has become exces-
sively asymmetrical as far as exports 
and imports are concerned. Russian ex-
ports of oil, gas, and some other raw 
materials to CEE have, at a lower level 
in any case, survived into the twenty-first 
century, while „traditional” (i.e. devel-
oped specifically for exports to the Soviet 
Union) CEE exports of manufactures and 
food – have not.  
There is a mutual dependence on 
Russian exports of energy to CEE. For 
the CEEs, Russia is a cheap (relative to 
alternative sources), reliable, geographi-
cally near-by supplier of most of their 
needed imports of energy, with estab-
lished and well-functioning transport in-
frastructure. For Russia, CEE remains the 
market outlet for a large part of its ex-
ports of oil and gas, and one of the 
important transit routes for its actual 
and potential energy exports to Western 
and Southern Europe, as well as Asia 
Minor. CEE is also an area for promis-
ing foreign investments of leading Rus-
sian oil and gas companies.  
Just the opposite seems to be the case 
with CEE exports to Russia: in macro-
economic sense, present trade data are 
witness of mutual „independence”, fol-
lowing the not-so-long process of smash-
ing and deconstruction of large-scale 
business relations of the CMEA period. 
The Russian share in CEE exports is 
about 2 percent, while about 6 percent 
of total Russian imports come from CEE 
(the six former CMEA members). In such 
a situation it is simply irrelevant to raise 
the question of eventual further negative 
implications of CEEs’ full membership in 
the European Union. This is not to ig-
nore the highly protectionist and divisive 
policies of the Union, aimed, first of all, 
at imposing more administrative controls 
and restrictions on crossing its borders 
by nationals (inhabitants) of non-member 
states, at limiting cross-border (shuttle) 
trading and employment (legal and ille-
gal). The injurious negative human (re-
gional) implications of those policies, the 
eventual difficulties of business as usual 
notwithstanding, the macro-economic im-
pact of the measures for Russia–CEE 
trade seems to be limited. By all means, 
they should not conceal the deeper, basic 
causes of the decay in relations.  
However, following Eastern enlarge-
ment, uncertainties facing Russian ex-
ports to CEEs, and, especially energy, 
may increase, if the Union’s endeavours 
at securing energy supplies are not 
made consistent with the interests of 
Russia in establishing secure and long-
term legal and physical infrastructure 
for exporting energy to Europe. The 
question relates very much to enlarge-
ment. The issue that may touch upon 
Russia–CEE relations is the share of the 
gas (and perhaps other energy) supplies 
the EU is prepared to allow from any 
one source. Officially, there are no re-
strictions on this amount, but it is rec-
ommended that not more than 30 per-
cent of gas imports should derive from 
one source, given the dependency which 
the future EU members have for Russian 
gas. It is well-known that the present 
share of Russian gas in CEE imports is 
much higher. The eventual enforcement 
of the restriction (which, under present 
circumstances, does not seem to corre-
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spond to interests of the Union’s security 
of supply) would seriously impair Rus-
sian exports to CEEs, energy situation of 
the latter, as well as the realisation of 
the EU—Russia energy partnership. 
Whatever should come of the energy 
problem, or of other possible dangers 
and uncertainties of Russia–CEE trade, 
the most important thing is to have a 
clear conception of the factors behind 
the present situation in trade. The prob-
lems are different in character. A lot of 
important problems of Russia–CEE trade 
have nothing to do with the EU (they 
have to do with the Russian economy as 
a whole), and full membership of CEEs 
will not change them even an iota. Other 
current problems (related to the competi-
tive positions of CEE’s firms in the Rus-
sian markets) may even be easier to deal 
with, when Central Europeans will be 
fully within the EU. A third category of 
problems (determining geographical and 
commodity pattern of CEE’s trade) relates 
to the globalization of economies of the 
region, or, some characteristics of the 
present global division of labour. 
Some CEEs were losing positions on 
the Russian markets not only after 1989–
1990, but following the financial crisis of 
1998, to the EU and other countries. In 
some cases, political difficulties might 
have played a role. Generally speaking 
however, CEE exporters are squeezed out 
of the market because of lack of com-
petitiveness as far as, for example, fi-
nancing is concerned. In this respect, EU 
exporters of agricultural products are in 
far better position than CEEs. Countries 
with a large share of food in exports to 
Russia (Hungary in 1996–1997) have 
suffered a significant decline. Full mem-
bership may even help to improve com-
petitive positions in this respect. 
CEE trade with the world is mostly 
dominated by multinationals. Multina-
tional companies established in CEEs are 
part of complex global production, as-
sembly and marketing networks. They 
export and import mostly through the 
channels of intra-company transactions 
(or their intra-company transactions via 
national borders are called exports and 
imports); to the degree that those chan-
nels are keeping away from Russia be-
cause of the relatively slow joining of 
this country into multinational division of 
labour, neither their products do get (at 
least, directly from CEEs) to Russia.  
The real and most important problem 
is however structural weakness of Rus-
sian exports (and of Russian industry), 
the lack of internationally competitive 
manufacturing industry, and the conse-
quent large-scale dependence of economic 
growth on development of international 
oil prices. Also, because of inherited 
from Soviet times weaknesses and the 
protracted crisis of the 1990s, the size 
of Russian import market is much 
smaller than usually presumed. 
As far as Hungarian—Russian rela-
tions are concerned, 1.3 percent of Hun-
garian exports went to Russia (0.8 per-
cent to Ukraine and 2.4 percent to the 
whole of CIS taken together) in 2002, 
while 6 percent of imports originated in 
Russia (7.8 percent in CIS as a whole). 
Following some improvement in bilateral 
relations (and the cyclical downturn in 
Western Europe constraining the growth 
of Hungarian exports to the EU), Rus-
sian share in Hungarian exports grew to 
1.5 percent in 2003. Imports from Rus-
sia reached 6.2 percent of total Hungar-
ian imports last year. As mentioned, the 
difference between the shares of exports 
and imports comes from the fact that 
while the former declined very seriously 
as compared to pre-1989 situation, the 
most of primary energy continues to be 
imported from Russia. Due to strong 
discrepancies between imports and ex-
ports, the most of the trade deficit is 
taking its origin in trade with Russia 
(59.6 percent in 2001, 55.9 in 2002 – 
but only 46 percent in 2003). Comparing 
fresh data with those of some years ear-
lier, as far as exports is concerned, the 
losses are disquieting even relative to low 
data of the first half of the 1990s. (In 
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1996–1997, share of Russia in Hungar-
ian exports was about 5 percent.) While 
trade with other former CMEA countries 
also is not showing a rosy picture, in 
2002 Hungary exported to the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Romania 
each more than to Russia. In imports, 
because of deliveries of energy, Russia 
has remained a partner of decisive im-
portance, however its role is changing in 
so far as imports from CEE (former 
CMEA), in aggregate, surpass those from 
Russia.  
Following the financial crisis of 1998, 
Hungarian exports to Russia in dollar 
terms decreased to one-third in two 
years before showing some moderate in-
crease recently. Although direction of 
change in each year (and in the whole 
of the period between 1997–2002) con-
formed to that of the total Russian im-
ports, the original fall was heavier, the 
consolidation following 2000 – more 
slaggish than in Russian trade with most 
countries. While patterns of Russian im-
ports have changed to the detriment of 
CEEs, Hungary has fallen backwards 
even within the group of CEEs. From a 
Hungarian point of view, the big prob-
lem with that is that the decline (espe-
cially after 2000) has coincided with a 
more general slow-down in exports and 
industrial growth. 
Decline in trade relations following 
1998 is not only due to the problems of 
Russian economy. Hungarian policies 
(and policies of other CEEs) also bear a 
part of responsibility. However, longer-
term trade trends between CEEs and 
Russia depend basically on the situation 
of Russian economy and the size of Rus-
sian import market. Following the grave, 
almost 50 percent decline of GDP be-
tween 1991–1998, the economy is on a 
dynamic stage now, even if the produc-
tion level of 1989 is a way off. Dyna-
mism is nourished by political stability, 
the depreciation of the rouble after 1998 
(making many important segments of the 
domestic production competitive with the 
imports) and the high international oil 
prices. However, structurally, the econ-
omy is weak. As a singular case in the 
world outside the OPEC, number one 
mover of economic development is high 
oil prices, although Russia can not influ-
ence their level. Russian (formerly Soviet) 
intentions to develop internationally com-
petitive manufacturing and abolish quasi-
monoculture of fuel exports have been 
known for about three decades, however 
no changes have followed. Therefore, 
Russian dependence on the international 
oil and gas markets is very high: 55 
percent of its exports consist of fuels.  
Moreover, not only structural weak-
nesses and eventual instability make fu-
ture development of Russian economy 
somewhat uncertain, but the country’s 
potential to import, although widening, is 
relatively limited for the time being. Ac-
cording to UN data, in 2001, Russian 
imports from the world (about USD 42 
billion) were less than Polish ones (50 
billion) and little more than Hungary’s 
imports (34 billion). Correspondingly, 
Russia’s share in world imports was 
0,72 percent as compared to Poland’s 
0.87 and Hungary’s 0.58 – or to the 
country’s own 1.72 percent share in 
world exports. No significant change oc-
cured in 2002. Russian imports reached 
USD 46.2 billion (0,76 percent of world 
imports) as compared to Poland’s 55.1 
billion (0.91 percent) and Hungary’s 37.8 
billion (0.62 percent). 
Which means that as far as its import 
potentials are concerned, Russia today 
belongs to the same class of countries as 
Poland, and some other CEEs. Of course, 
the situation may change in a short pe-
riod of time. Some of the questions per-
taining are: will the present rate of 
growth of Russian economy persist, eco-
nomic uncertainties inside the country 
subside, terms-of-trade steadily improve 
and trade growth accelerate. Even in 
such case, Hungarian exports (as well as 
exports of other CEEs) to Russian mar-
kets may remain limited for a longer 
period of time as development needs of 
the Russian economy will mostly be cov-
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ered by deliveries from the most ad-
vanced countries, while China will re-
main an inexhaustible as well as the 
cheapest source of imports of mass con-
sumption goods. Eventual advancement of 
multinationals in Russian economy may 
lead to growing role of foreign investors 
in the selection of trade channels and 
trading partners.  
All that leads us to conclude that no 
basic changes as a consequence of full 
membership should be expected, as far 
as trade orientation of CEEs (Hungary 
included), and the prevailing role of the 
Union (respectively Germany) in external 
relations is concerned. Of course, there 
are a lot of unanswered (unanswerable) 
questions related not so much to the ef-
fects of de jure membership, than to 
economic development of EU25 and the 
future of European integration. 
 
* * * * * 
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF EU ENLARGEMENT ON TRADE 
RELATIONS BETWEEN BELARUS AND THE VISEGRÁD 
COUNTRIES 
Stanislav Vassilevsky* 
The enlargement process of the European 
Union (EU) is utterly challenging for the 
Republic of Belarus, the brand-new 
neighbour of the community, particularly 
from the point of view of trade policy. 
The prevailing tendency of recent 
years is evident: there was a dynamic 
development of foreign trade between 
Belarus and the EU countries. In 2003 
Belarusian exports to the EU increased 
compared to 2002 more than 1.5 times 
and amounted to 2.280 billion USD. The 
Belarusian exports to the Visegrád coun-
tries amounted to 0.611 billion USD (Ta-
ble 1). 
 
 
 
 
In general, Belarusian exports to the 
countries that are present-day members 
of the EU reached more than 35% of 
total Belarusian exports in 2003 proving 
the European vector to be a priority di-
rection of Belarusian foreign economic 
policy. It is important to notice, that the 
exports of Belarusian goods to the EU 
countries for the last three years has 
increased more than three times (from 
1.2 billion USD in 1998 to 3.7 billion 
USD in 2003). 
The major export goods of Belarus to 
the Visegrád countries are oil, oil prod-
ucts, gas, fertilizers, cement, steel and 
wood products, tractors, parts of trac-
tors and automobiles, casein, 
while the major imports are 
electric lamps, tubes, pharma-
ceuticals, consumer products, 
plastics, pumps, varnishes, 
slag, wool, fibreboard and 
fruits.  
With the enlargement of the 
EU Europe is not bipolar any 
more. The geopolitical impor-
tance of the territory of Bela-
rus, the main transport corri-
dor between Russia and 
Europe, is growing rapidly. 
This unique importance of 
transit will have to provide substantial 
funds to modernize a considerable part 
of the country’s industry. 
Belarus expects that increasing struc-
tural support to the Visegrád countries 
Table 1 
The trade of Belarus with the EU 
and the Visegrád countries in 2003  
(ths. USD) 
 
Country Exports Imports Turnover 
Hungary 105475 37802 143277 
Poland 434171 348489 782660 
Slovakia 22334 25463 47797 
Czech Republic 49286 74477 123763 
Visegrád countries 611266 486231 1097497 
EU countries 2279000 1777000 4056000 
Total 2890266 2263231 5153497 
* Foreign Economic Activity Coordination De-
partment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Belarus. 
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within the EU (PHARE, SAPARD, ISPA, 
etc.) and direct payments from the 
common budget will consolidate capital 
supply in the new member countries, 
which, in turn, will encourage them to 
invest in neighbouring non-member 
states, including the Republic of Belarus. 
The total positive balance of support for 
Poland in the forthcoming three years 
will account to 6998, for Hungary 1374, 
for the Czech Republic 778 and for Slo-
vakia 831 million euros. 
At the same time, besides the positive 
effects of EU enlargement, there are 
some factors that can damage the inter-
ests of trade and economic cooperation 
between Belarus and the Visegrád coun-
tries. On acceding to the Union the 
European Commission requires candidate 
countries to denounce intergovernmental 
agreements on trade and economic coop-
eration with the Republic of Belarus, 
which provide the most-favoured-nation 
treatment in mutual trade. However, this 
trade regime is used de facto in com-
mercial and economic relations between 
Belarus and the EU. 
The shift to the EU’s common cus-
toms-tariff and preference system by the 
new member states can either bring tan-
gible benefits or create extra tariff walls. 
For example, the conditions for the ac-
cess of Belarusian goods to Hungary, 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
are improving in general, as the rates of 
customs duties are higher in these coun-
tries then in the EU-15. On the other 
hand, the tariff conditions to enter the 
Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian markets 
will become worse. (Table 2)   
It is obvious, that the enlargement of 
the EU will bring about problems for the 
exports of certain groups of products 
from Byelorussia to the Visegrád coun-
tries because the application of non-tariff 
trade measures of the EU will be auto-
matically extended to the new EU mem-
ber states. 
The extension of these restrictive trade 
measures concerns first of all the auto-
matic application of the antidumping du-
ties for potash, nitric fertilizers and 
chemical fibres as well as the application 
of import quotas for textile products. As 
a consequence, the total negative effect 
of the extension of antidumping meas-
ures only on the EU–Belarus bilateral 
trade could account for 110 million USD 
per year, including up to 65 million 
USD of Belarusian exports to the 
Visegrád countries (mainly potash to Po-
land, Slovakia and the Czech Republic as 
well as the small amounts of polyester 
staples to Hungary and Poland). 
Fortunately, the voluntary quantitative 
export obligations of Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine in regard of the supply of pot-
ash fertilizers to the new EU members 
 
Table 2 
Consequences of tariff changes in the Visegrád countries to the exports of Belarus 
(calculated on the basis of overall trade results, 2003) 
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were accepted by the European Commis-
sion in May 2004. They will last until 
May 2005 and partly soothe the stated 
issue in the short run. 
The full list of non-tariff measures of 
the EU regarding the exports of Belarus 
is listed in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Non-tariff measures of the EU regarding 
the exports of Belarus 
(February 1, 2004) 
 
Product Measure 
Textile     
products 
Quotas, for 34 out of     
146 categories 
Carbamide Anti-dumping duty, 7%+7EURO/ton 
Potash Anti-dumping duty,      19–48EURO/ton 
Urea-ammoniac 
mixture 
Anti-dumping duty, 
6,5%+17,86EURO/ton 
Polyester staple Anti-dumping duty, 15,8–21% 
 
Besides, the Belarusian exporters will 
confront with the technical barriers for 
their export production in terms of the 
accordance to the standards and norms 
of the EU. The most important are the 
EU technical security and ecological re-
quirements, which touch upon food, 
growing wild products and industrial 
products (tractors, automobiles, TV sets) 
originated in Belarus. 
Preliminary steps and measures to be 
taken to mitigate the possible negative 
effects of the enlargement of the EU for 
the mutual trade of the Republic of Bel-
arus and the Visegrád countries are the 
following: 
(1) To reach new bilateral trade and in-
vestment agreements between the Re-
public of Belarus and the Visegrád 
countries in order to avoid the legal 
vacuum in mutual economic relations. 
(2) To elaborate and to realize the pro-
gram for ISO 9000 and 14000 certi-
fication of products and quality sys-
tems in Belarus at national level. 
(3) To set up the transitional period for 
the application of the antidumping 
measures of the EU in the Visegrád 
countries after the enlargement. 
(4) To increase the quotas on the imports 
of Belarusian textile products to the 
EU, which are most sensible to the 
process of the EU enlargement. 
(5) To formulate and realize jointly the 
concept of the neighbourhood of the 
EU.  
 
* * * * * 
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THE SUNNY AND SHADY SIDES OF RUSSIAN ECONOMIC 
RECOVERY 
Ruslan Grinberg* 
ADVANTAGES 
There has been a visible growth in the 
economy of Russia for the last few 
years, proven by the increase in all mac-
roeconomic indicators: GDP 28.5%, indus-
trial production 30.5%, investment 50%, 
real income of population 56.5%, agricul-
tural production 18.5% for the period 
2000–2003. Moreover, the annual rate 
of inflation has decreased from 36% to 
12% (a reduction to a third its previous 
level), and gold and foreign reserves 
have increased six times up to 75 billion 
USD. 
The year 2003 was especially positive 
and that was quite unexpected for most 
of the experts. The deceleration in eco-
nomic growth was expected but there 
was an acceleration of 6.7%.  
There was another positive surprise – 
the significant growth in investment ac-
tivity. Investments in fixed capital in-
creased during the year 2002 by 2.6% 
and in the year 2003 by 12.5%. The ex-
pert community in Russia at the begin-
ning of this century was seized with the 
idea of “a fatal phenomenon” for the 
year 2003. The idea originated in the 
coincidence of foreign debt repayments 
at their peak and the collapse of infra-
structure due to a high degree of dete-
rioration. The dreary prophecies turned 
out to be wrong this time. The country 
was not only able to pay back a major 
part of its foreign debt (almost 17 billion 
USD) but it was also able to reduce the 
ratio of foreign debt to GDP (from 36% 
to 27%). There were some man-caused 
disasters but they were not as numerous 
as expected.  
Other successes achieved in 2003 in-
clude: 
* The record growth in commodity ex-
ports and imports with unprecedent-
edly high active trade balance at the 
level of 60 billion USD.  
* An increase in the inflow of FDI (6 
billion USD). 
* The beginning of the process of “de-
dollarization” in domestic money cir-
culation; according to various esti-
mates Russians converted about 6 bil-
lion USD into rubles by opening ruble 
accounts with banks (10% to 20% of 
dollar savings hidden “into stockings” 
and “under mattresses”). 
* Russia was granted the investment 
rating (Moody’s). 
* The enactment of the long-expected 
law about private bank deposits in-
surance (100 K. RUR.). 
* The rapid dynamics on the stock 
market; the total capitalization of Rus-
sian companies has almost doubled in 
a year and amounts to 200 billion 
USD.  
* The rapid growth in crediting for du-
rable consumer goods. 
* Institute for International Economic and Politi-
cal Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences 
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* It was the first time from the begin-
ning of market reforms when the ma-
jority of population had better subjec-
tive perception of its own welfare po-
sition; almost half of the recently in-
terrogated respondents of an inde-
pendent sociological survey – 48% – 
have regarded themselves as belonging 
to the middle class.  
DISADVANTAGES 
The most conspicuous of them is that the 
75% growth of GDP was the conse-
quence of an increase in fuel and raw 
materials exports when world prices 
were kept at a stable and high level. 
The “Dutch disease” becomes apparent in 
modern Russia in full measure. The 
country has experienced “growth without 
development”. In other words, the eco-
nomic orientation for fuel and raw ma-
terials continue to become apparent 
without any serious progress in industrial 
diversification and modernization. Its 
structure remains primitive.  
Other neglects and failures in the 
year 2003:  
* The regress in the dynamics of small- 
and medium-scale business; small- and 
medium-scale businesses produce only 
10% of GDP, and there is almost no 
state support to this type of busi-
nesses. 
* There is no success achieved in con-
solidating the post-Soviet area due to 
the fact that centrifugal tendencies are 
stronger than centripetal forces.  
* Despite the growth in GDP there is an 
increase in unemployment due to the 
discontinuance in import substitution 
as a result of growth of ruble real 
exchange rate (by 13% in 2003).  
* The growth in personal income was 
not similar: the lion’s share (2/3) ac-
counted for 20% of the wealthiest 
Russians, who had already benefited 
from the market reforms; as a result 
social polarization has also increased.  
* The selective approach to the privati-
zation deals of the 1990s also does 
not improve the investment climate in 
the country. 
* The regress in the development of a 
civil society, “the atomization of a so-
ciety”.  
* The oligarchic capitalism gives place 
to a bureaucratic one. 
PROSPECTS 
To all appearances there will be nothing 
new on the qualitative side in this year, 
although economic policy in the country 
for the second presidential term should 
desirably be adjusted and based on state 
activity and private initiative complement-
ing each other. Now there are only a 
few differences from the policy realized 
at the beginning of reforms. It is possi-
ble to call it the policy of “modernization 
based on ideological liberalism” or the 
concept of “minimum state”. Virtually, 
there is a substitution of the aim with 
the tool. The improvement in the welfare 
of Russians, or the whole nation in other 
words, can be the only aim. We still 
have as the aim the so-called triad from 
the Washington consensus: stabilization, 
liberalization and privatization. And the 
government announces its aspirations to 
carry out the same policy in the future 
by following these tracks. It has as a 
result the bizarre idea of creating a sta-
bilizing fund, the duplicate of CBR gold 
and foreign reserves, but for this time 
they will be at the disposal of the Minis-
try of Finance. It is an inert policy of 
taking away the excess profits from oil 
industrialists, an almost maniacal convic-
tion in fact, that only the reduction of 
the tax burden will guarantee a stable 
economic growth and, at last, the rejec-
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tion of taking responsibility in the social 
sphere as a budget policy.  
The tendency of “primitivization” in 
the Russian economy under the circum-
stances is becoming irreversible even if it 
is possible to achieve a breakthrough in 
following the law and stabilizing the 
conditions for business life. While main-
taining economic dynamics with the pow-
erful raw materials industries due to 
their export potentials, a significant 
share of manufacturing industry will 
loose all prospects for development. In 
general, this is the way how a country 
is slipping beyond the world of intellec-
tual and technological backwardness. 
Still, there is a real alternative to this 
variant based on the principles of ra-
tional-pragmatic liberalism. Thereupon it 
will be necessary to activate the available 
potential in research and production with 
the aim to achieve the international level 
of competitiveness in selected industries 
and sectors of the Russian economy. Fol-
lowing this way means the development 
and the realization of an appropriate 
structural and innovative policy. It is the 
only strategy that offers the chance for 
a conscious structuring of the post-Soviet 
era or at least the most of it. And it is 
the only means to launch own competi-
tive transnational corporations able to 
participate in globalization as subjects 
instead of being the objects of the proc-
ess.  
Thus it is extremely important not to 
be tempted to run into extreme meas-
ures of state expansionism, threatening 
to replace the boundless liberalism of the 
1990s. Russian society should realize that 
the lack of state regulation is as harmful 
for the market economy as its overabun-
dance. Otherwise, it will constantly jump 
from the arbitrariness of authority to the 
authority of arbitrariness and back loos-
ing all chances to a progressive and civi-
lized modernization of the country. 
* * * * * 
 
